The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns by Ross, William G.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 42 | Number 2 Article 3
1-1-2002
The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential
Campaigns
William G. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 391 (2002).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss2/3
THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL ISSUES IN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
William G. Ross*
I. INTRODUCTION
After sporadic appearances in presidential campaigns
throughout American history, judicial issues are becoming a
permanent fixture in presidential contests. The President's
power to nominate federal judges has emerged as at least a
moderately important issue during the past several presiden-
tial campaigns, and judicial issues were more prominent in
the 2000 campaign than in any election since 1968. The
growing salience of the courts in presidential elections re-
flects increasing public awareness of the power of federal
judges, particularly the Supreme Court Justices, and height-
ened appreciation of the President's ability to influence the
courts through judicial nominations. Growing public sophis-
tication about the judiciary's importance seems likely to en-
sure that judicial issues will remain a feature of presidential
campaigns.
If history is any guide, however, judicial issues are likely
to continue to produce much campaign bluster but will affect
few ballots. While the impact of judicial issues on voting pat-
terns is difficult to discern, there is evidence that presidential
candidates use judicial issues more as a means of rallying the
party faithful than swaying undecided voters. Voters who
agree with a candidate's judicial philosophy or with the type
of judicial appointments that he promises to make are likely
to agree with the candidate's views on legislative and admin-
istrative issues. Judicial issues therefore often merely reflect
how voters already feel about a candidate on more salient
* Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Professor of Law,
Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. J.D., Harvard Law School;
A.B., Stanford University.
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legislative and administrative issues.
Nevertheless, judicial issues have significance in presi-
dential contests that transcend the actual number of votes
that they change. Presidential campaigns provide a unique
forum for public discussion of judicial issues. Dialogue be-
tween voters and candidates about judicial issues, while too
often shallow, helps to shape public opinion about individualjudicial decisions as well as broader legal issues. It also pro-
vides a barometer of public attitudes toward the Supreme
Court. Presidential contests therefore can influence and have
indeed affected subsequent judicial nominations and legisla-
tion affecting the courts. The impact of judicial issues in
presidential campaigns and elections has received very little
attention from scholars or other commentators.' The subject
is ignored even in detailed studies of presidential campaigns.2
It deserves more attention because judicial issues have played
a role in many elections during the past two hundred years
and are now a staple of presidential politics. By chronologi-
cally tracing the use of judicial issues in past elections, this
article will demonstrate that the use of judicial issues reveals
much about the role of the judiciary in American society. In
particular, this article will argue that the use of judicial is-
sues in presidential campaigns illustrates 1) the decline of ef-
forts by critics of the courts to curb the institutional powers of
the courts and the concomitant growth of efforts to change ju-
dicial decisions by influencing the appointment of judges; 2)
the abiding public respect of Americans for the judiciary; 3)
the paucity of public sophistication about legal issues and the
growth of such sophistication during recent years; 4) the
manner in which judicial issues are inextricably intertwined
with political issues; and 5) the ways in which voter reaction
to judicial issues has influenced subsequent judicial appoint-
ments and legislation.
1. Virtually the only study is DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS (1999).
2. See BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA AFIRE: JEFFERSON, ADAMS,
AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ELECTION OF 1800 (2000); JOHN C. WAUGH, RE-
ELECTING LINCOLN: THE BATTLE FOR THE 1864 PRESIDENCY (1997); ZACHARY
KARABELL, THE LAST CAMPAIGN: How HARRY TRUMAN WON THE 1948
ELECTION (2000); EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM, A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS (1957).
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II. DISCUSSION
Since presidential elections occur only every four years, a
detailed study of the history of judicial issues in presidential
elections is essential to understanding the role of such issues
in elections. This historical study will demonstrate that cer-
tain features of judicial issues in presidential campaigns have
remained remarkably consistent through the years. In par-
ticular, voters have sensed the importance of judicial issues,
but have lacked the sophistication or interest to respond to
nuanced discussion of legal issues. Judicial issues have often
served as proxies for broader political issues. Moreover, the
abiding respect of voters for the Court has inhibited candi-
dates from criticizing the Court as an institution or attacking
individual Justices.
Judicial issues may have figured in some elections before
1860. In 1800, for example, the controversy over the federal
judiciary's enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts may
have helped to defeat President John Adams and elect Tho-
mas Jefferson.3 Although political controversy over the Mar-
shall Court's activism did not transform the Court into an
3. See STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 31-51. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 168 (rev. ed. 1937). The so-called
Alien and Sedition Acts were enacted in response to Federalist fears of foreign-
ers that arose from antagonism between the Americans and the French during
the Napoleonic Wars. See, e.g., 1 MELVIN UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A
MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 182
(2002). The Alien and Sedition Acts included the Naturalization Act, which in-
creased from five to fourteen years the residency requirements for naturaliza-
tion; the Alien Act, which gave the President power to expel suspected subver-
sive non-citizens; the Alien Enemies Act, which permitted the President in time
of war to imprison or expel aliens; and the Sedition Act, which forbade "false,
scandalous and malicious writing" against the President or Congress. Id. The
Sedition Act, which was intended in part to discourage Republican criticisms of
the Federalists during the upcoming presidential campaign, was strongly op-
posed by Republicans, whose general sympathies toward the French also made
them hostile to the anti-alien legislation. See id. The relish with which Feder-
alist judges enforced the laws helped to transform the Acts into an election is-
sue. See STEPHENSON, supra note 1 at 34-37, 39-41. As Professor Stephenson
has explained, "[d]enunciation of the Alien and Sedition Acts comprised a key
part of the policy alternatives Republicans offered voters in 1800. Those laws
were not the only issue of the campaign ... but without them it is far from cer-
tain that Republicans would have won." Id. at 39. In particular, Jefferson en-
couraged newspapers to warn voters that the legislation threatened liberty, and
numerous editors and publicists used the legislation as an argument against
Adam's re-election. See id. at 39-40. Federalists tended to ignore Republican
attacks on the Acts, but they warned that election of Jefferson could produce
public disorder or even anarchy. See id. at 40.
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election issue during the early nineteenth century,4 judicial
issues played an important role in the election of 1832, in
which the controversy over President Jackson's veto of the
renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States fo-
cused public attention on the Court's decisions expanding the
federal government's power, particularly its 1819 decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland' sustaining the Bank's constitution-
ality.6 National Republicans warned that Democratic support
for measures to forbid appeals from state courts to the U.S
Supreme Court threatened the Court's independence and
power.7 It was only in the 1860 election, however, that judi-
cial issues became prominent.
A. The 1860 Election
The Supreme Court's highly controversial defense of
slavery in its 1857 Dred Scott decision8 caused judicial issues
to be significant in the election of 1860.' In contrast to later
periods of controversy over the Court, opponents of Dred Scott
sought merely to overturn this particular decision rather than
to curb the Court's institutional powers.
[Tihe Republican remedy for the Dred Scott decision was
to win the election of 1860, change the personnel of the
Court, and have the decision reversed. According to Lin-
coln, a Republican victory at the polls would be enough in
itself to prevent further proslavery onslaughts by the ex-
isting Court.'
Likewise, advocates of slavery were convinced that Republi-
cans would appoint anti-slavery Justices who would overrule
Dred Scott." Fear of extension of slavery enabled Lincoln to
4. See STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 68-69 (discussing the fact that theCourt was not an issue in the campaigns of 1820, 1824, or 1828). Professor Ste-phenson has concluded that the Court did not become an issue, despite wide-
spread opposition to its nationalizing decisions, because the elections of the
1820's tended to focus on personalities rather than on policies. See id.
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6. See STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 53-80.
7. See id. at 75.
8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
9. For an extended discussion of the Court's role in the 1860 campaign, see
STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 81-106.
10. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 454 (1978).
11. See WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 51-52 (1988).
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sweep the North so thoroughly that Charles Warren declared,
"Chief Justice Taney elected Abraham Lincoln to the Presi-
dency."12
But while Republicans had bitterly assailed the Court for
Dred Scott for a long while after the decision was rendered in
1857,1" Republican attacks on the Court "were softened during
the campaign or dropped outright" as "part of the Republican
attempt to moderate their stance and undercut charges that
the party was disloyal to the Constitution."14 Although the
Republican platform did not specifically mention the Supreme
Court or Dred Scott, it implicitly repudiated the Court's deci-
sion in Dred Scott.' In contrast, the Democratic platform on
which Stephen A. Douglas stood declared that "the Demo-
cratic party will abide by the decision of the Supreme Court"
regarding slavery in the territories. 6 The reluctance of the
Republicans to criticize the Court despite the widespread exe-
cration of Dred Scott provides an early example of how politi-
cians have recognized that the Court is so widely respected,
even when its decisions are unpopular, that attacks on the
Court are politically parlous.
B. The 1864 Election
In 1864, the looming appointment of a successor to Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney, who died three weeks before the elec-
tion, did not become an election issue. Although Republican
George Templeton Strong expressed confidence in his diary
that "[elven should Lincoln be defeated, he will have time to
appoint a new Chief Justice,"7 the Senate in the past had
12. 2 WARREN, supra note 3, at 357.
13. The decision was a prominent feature of the debates between Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in their 1858 contest for an Illinois Senate seat.
See THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 22, 42, 101-02, 151, 168-73, 263-64, 295-
96, 320, 325, 360, 361-62 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993).
14. LASSER, supra note 11, at 51.
15. The platform declared that
the new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force, carries slavery
into any or all of the territories of the United States, is a dangerous po-
litical heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instru-
ment itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and
judicial precedent; it is revolutionary in its tendency, and subversive of
the peace and harmony of the country.
1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 32 (Donald Bruce Johnson compiler, 1978).
16. See id. at 31.
17. 3 THE DIARY OF GEORGE TEMPLETON STRONG 500 (Allan Nevins & Mil-
ton Halsey Thomas eds., 1952).
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generally looked unfavorably upon Supreme Court nomina-
tions by lame duck presidents.18 The failure of the appoint-
ment to influence the election, even though the appointment
probably hinged on the election's outcome, may have reflected
preoccupation with the war or perhaps a belief that either
Lincoln or the Democratic candidate George McClellan would
appoint a similar person. Strong's observation that Lincoln
could not "appoint anyone worse than Taney"19 suggests that
he and other Republicans felt that neither would McClellan
appoint anyone worse than the despised author of Dred Scott.
C. The 1896 Election
The tumultuous 1896 contest between Republican Wil-
liam McKinley and Democrat William Jennings Bryan was
the first in which the Court itself appears to have been a sig-
nificant election issue. Populists who supported Bryan were
outraged by the Supreme Court's triad of 1895 decisions that
invalidated the federal income tax,0 vitiated the Sherman
Antitrust Act,"' and upheld the conviction of labor leader
Eugene V. Debs for violating a federal injunction against dis-
order during a strike." Since many populists believed that
these decisions sharpened the "crown of thorns" that Bryan
alleged that plutocrats were trying to "press down upon the
brow of labor," hostility toward the Court probably intensified
support for Bryan.
The Democratic platform focused on the Court as the
source of many problems. Specifically, the Court's decisions
nullifying the income tax were a major focus. The platform
blamed the national deficit on the Court's decisions nullifying
the income tax, which the platform derided for overturning
18. The Senate rejected or refused to act on five of President Tyler's six
nominees during Tyler's fourteen months in office, the Senate refused to act on
three of President Fillmore's nominees during his final year as President, and
the Senate rejected a Buchanan nominee during Buchanan's last month in of-fice. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 105-06, 110-11, 114-15 (2d ed.
1985).
19. Id. at 110.
20. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
21. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
22. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
23. See 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 99.
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nearly a century of precedent,24 and declared that Congress
had a duty to use its constitutional power to ensure an equi-
table allocation of taxation.25 The Democratic platform ex-
pressed objection "to government by injunction as a new and
highly dangerous form of oppression by which Federal Judges
... become at once legislators, judges and executioners."" Ac-
cordingly, it supported pending federal legislation to provide
for trial by jury in certain cases of contempt.
Fearing that direct criticism of the courts would bolster
Republican warnings that he was a revolutionary, Bryan in
his campaign generally eschewed acerbic rhetoric and made a
deliberate effort to emphasize that he did not challenge judi-
cial authority.27 As Bryan campaigned tirelessly through the
country, he often implied that the Court's decisions had tight-
ened the yoke of oppression from which he promised to free
the people. In contrast to Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 and
Robert M. LaFollette in 1924, however, Bryan proposed no in-
stitutional changes. Despite the circumspection of Bryan and
most of his supporters, Republicans throughout the campaign
attempted to exploit Democratic criticism of the courts. Vari-
ous Republicans alleged that the Democrats sought to destroy
judicial review and perhaps even constitutional government.28
24. See id. at 98.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 99.
27. For example, in the legendary "Cross of Gold" speech that clinched his
nomination, Bryan denied that populists had criticized the Court. Rebuking
conservatives who "criticize us for our criticism of the Supreme Court," Bryan
protested that populists had merely called attention to the Court's inconsistency
and had defended the justice of an income tax. 2 HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1847 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1971). Like-
wise, Bryan declared in his acceptance speech that "we expressly recognize the
binding force of [the] decision ... as it stands as part of the law of the land" and
that the Democratic platform contained "no suggestion of an attempt to dispute
the authority of the Supreme Court." Id. at 1853.
28. In his letter accepting the nomination, for example, McKinley vowed
that Republicans would vanquish "the sudden, dangerous, and revolutionary
assault upon law and order." Mr. McKinley Accepts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1896,
at 1. Former President Benjamin Harrison told a mass rally at Carnegie Hall
that no issue was more important than the Democratic proposal for "protecting
the power and duty of the National courts and National Executive." General
Harrison Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1896, at 1. Harrison interpreted the
Democratic platform as calling for the packing of the Supreme Court whenever
the Court's interpretation of a law displeased Congress. Meanwhile, Roman
Catholic Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul accused the Democrats of at-
tempting to strip the courts of their power and warned that this could lead to
communism. See CURRENT OPINION, Oct. 22, 1896, at 517. Similarly, the in-
39720021
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In the wake of the 1896 election, many newspapers in-
terpreted McKinley's victory as an expression of popular sup-
port for the integrity of the courts.29 An article in the Yale
Review after the election concluded that Bryan's defeat was
"undoubtedly due in part" to the Democratic platform's "at-
tack upon the Supreme Court.""0 Scholars who have studied
the election agree that these judicial issues probably influ-
enced the outcome.3 Most voters who were troubled by Re-
publican characterizations of Democratic criticism of the
courts, however, probably were also so frightened of Bryan's
inflationary schemes that they would not have voted for
Bryan anyway. 32 This is an early example of how judicial is-
sues often merely help to confirm or reinforce voter prefer-
ences. Although one scholar has concluded that Bryan might
have won more votes among Eastern workers if he had been
more forceful in his criticism of the Supreme Court's recent
unpopular decisions concerning the income tax and the use of
the injunction in labor disputes,3 the harsh Republican at-
tacks on Bryan for even his mild criticism of the courts sug-
gest that such a strategy would have been dangerous, even if
Bryan had taken pains to emphasize his fidelity to judicial
review and other constitutional principles.
dustrialist Chauncey M. DePew alleged that Bryan sought to "abolish the Su-preme Court and make it the creature of the party caucus whenever a new con-
gress comes in." CHAUNCEY M. DEPEW, SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES OF
CHAUNCEY M. DEPEw 62 (1898). Likewise, another McKinley supporter warned
that the Democratic platform vowed to reduce the Supreme Court "to a mere
creature of legislative will and subject it to the dangerous influence of party ex-
pediency or caprice." George A. Benham, Notes and Comments: The SupremeCourt of the United States, NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Oct. 1896, at 506-07.
Distorting the platform's careful language, which stated that Congress should
remain within the bounds laid down by the Court, this author condemned the
platform for favoring doctrines "striking at the very root of our system of gov-
ernment." Id. For a detailed discussion of editorial and other public reaction to
the Democratic platform, see Alan F. Westin, The Supreme Court, the Populist
Movement and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J. OF POLITICS 3, 30-39 (1953).
29. See Westin, supra note 28, at 38.
30. Thomas Thacher, Limits of Constitutional Law, 6 YALE REVIEW 7, 7(1897). Thacher argued that many voters who supported the free silver plank
and "were ready to fall in line with Bryan and his followers drew back when
they realized that the programme included an assault upon the 'bulwark of the
Constitution' or an attempt to still its 'living voice."' Id.
31. See id.; WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES,
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 37 (1994).
32. See ROSS, supra note 31.
33. See LOUIS W. KOENIG, BRYAN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM
JENNINGS BRYAN 225 (1971).
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D. The 1908 Election
The 1908 election was perhaps the first election in which
Supreme Court appointments figured as a significant issue.
Since four of the Justices were older than seventy, some vot-
ers appear to have considered what types of persons Republi-
can William Howard Taft or Democrat William Jennings
Bryan would nominate to the Court. Predicting that at least
four vacancies would occur during the next presidential term,
The World's Work declared that "few more important ques-
tions than this will come up during the campaign."" Simi-
larly, The New York Times stated in February that the likeli-
hood that Roosevelt's successor would name four Justices to
the Court was attracting widespread attention among politi-
cians." A group of prominent New York Democrats were so
worried that fears about Bryan's Court appointments would
erode Democratic support in the business community that
they urged Bryan to publicly declare that he would nominate
conservatives to the Court. Bryan flatly refused." Although
judicial appointments were not as important an issue as some
predicted, the judicial significance of the election was even
greater than most voters could have supposed, for Taft had
the opportunity to nominate six Justices during his four years
in office. The 1908 election therefore presaged the emer-
gence of judicial appointments as a significant issue in presi-
dential campaigns during the late twentieth century.
E. The 1912 Election
Judicial issues were more prominent in 1912 than in any
election campaign except those of 1924 and 1968. Long-
simmering discontent among populists, progressives, and la-
bor unions over the judiciary's hostility toward social and
economic regulation reached the boiling point in 1912, just as
the Progressive movement was reaching its crest. In re-
sponse to judicial obstruction of reform legislation, progres-
34. The Presidency and the Supreme Court, THE WORLD'S WORK, May 1908,
at 10171. See also The Supreme Court and the Next President, THE WORLD'S
WORK, October 1908, at 10740.
35. See Campaign to Affect Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1908, at 1.
36. See JOSEPHUS DANIELS, EDITOR IN POLITICS 548-50 (1941).
37. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO
CLINTON 309-13 (1999).
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sives in several western states had enacted measures for the
recall of state judges,38 and congressional liberals had pro-
posed a spate of proposals for curbing federal judicial power. 9
Attacks on the judiciary had become a staple of rhetoric
among progressives and labor unions, and two widely distrib-
uted broadsides against the courts were published during
1912.40
Despite all of this criticism of the courts, judicial issues
might not have become prominent in the 1912 election cam-
paign if former President Theodore Roosevelt, seeking the
presidency on the third-party Progressive ticket, had not
made the courts a major issue in his spirited campaign. In
his speech announcing his candidacy for the Republican
nomination in February 1912, Roosevelt unveiled a proposal
for curbing state courts that created almost as much of a sen-
sation as did his decision to challenge Taft for the nomina-
tion. Roosevelt advocated a procedure for a so-called "recall"
of judicial decisions which would permit the people of a state
to revise state supreme court decisions that nullified state
statutes on the grounds that they violated the state or federal
constitutions.41  Roosevelt's proposal reduced conservatives
and even many moderates to a form of political apoplexy.42 A
host of critics alleged that it would substitute mob rule for
constitutional government.
After Taft defeated Roosevelt for the Republican nomina-
tion, the platform of the newly formed Progressive Party
adopted Roosevelt's proposal, demanding "such restriction of
the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the ulti-
mate authority to determine fundamental questions of social
38. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 110-29.
39. See id. at 89, 90, 218.
40. See WILLIAM L. RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY (1912);
GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912).
41. See Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, Speech An-
nouncing his Candidacy for the Republican Nomination (Feb. 1912), in THEOUTLOOK, Feb. 24, 1912, at 390-412. Although Roosevelt publicly emphasized
that the proposal did not extend to federal decisions, he privately admitted that
it probably would. See Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States, to Herbert Croly (Feb. 29, 1912) (on file with Theodore Roosevelt Papers,
Series 31, Reel 374). Critics of the proposal had warned of this. See, e.g., Wil-liam B. Hornblower, The Independence of the Judiciary, The Safeguard of Free
Institutions, 22 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10 (1912).
42. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 137-38.
43. See id. at 143-44, 147-48.
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welfare and public policy."" Although Roosevelt defended the
recall of decisions in his acceptance speech,45 he devoted less
attention to judicial issues during his autumn campaign, per-
haps because he believed that the issue had cost him votes
among moderates during the spring and had hindered his ef-
fort to obtain the Republican nomination.
The Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson, also was
reticent about judicial issues. After denouncing the recall of
judicial decisions during the spring of 1912,46 Wilson virtually
ignored the issue during the autumn campaign. He ad-
dressed it only in September when he reiterated his earlier
assertions that reform of the judicial selection process was
the only way to purge the bench of judges who were beholden
to special interests. 7 Like Wilson, the Democratic platform
was circumspect about judicial issues.4"
Unlike Wilson and Roosevelt, Taft emphasized judicial
44. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 176. The platform
also urged the states to adopt the initiative, referendum, and recall, although it
did not explain whether this was intended to embrace the recall of judges. See
id. The platform further called for "a more easy and expeditious method of
amending the Federal Constitution." Id. It also endorsed legislation to permit
the Supreme Court to review state court judicial decisions that struck down
state statutes as violative of the federal constitution, a measure that was de-
signed to provide for federal review of state court decisions that struck down
economic regulatory legislation. See id. This measure was later embodied in
the Judiciary Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 790.
45. See Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, Purposes and
Policies of the Progressive Party, Acceptance Speech before the Progressive
Party Convention in Chicago (Aug. 6, 1912), in S. Doc. NO. 904, at 9 (1912). In
words that made conservatives wince, Roosevelt declared that "the people them-
selves must be the ultimate makers of their own Constitution." Id.
46. See 24 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 235-36, 350-51 (Arther S. Link ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1977); Wilson Opposes Recall of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1912, at 6.
47. See PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 46, at 240-41. Wilson ex-
plained that the recall of judges selected by powerful corporate interests would
accomplish no good if those same interests were permitted to select new judges.
See id.
48. The Democratic platform reiterated its 1908 platform's allegations that
the Republicans had raised "a false issue respecting the judiciary" and that "it is
an unjust reflection upon a great body of our citizens to assume that they lack
respect for the courts." 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 172.
As in 1908, the Democratic platform called for vigilance against abuse of judi-
cial processes and expressed support for reform of federal contempt proceedings.
See id. at 174. The platform also recognized "the urgent need of reform in the
administration of civil and criminal law" and recommended the enactment of
measures to "rid the present legal system of delays, expense, and uncertainties."
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issues throughout the campaign. In his speech accepting the
G.O.P. nomination, he declared that the preservation of the
Constitution was "the supreme issue" of the election. 49 Taft
bitterly assailed "hostility to the judiciary and the measures
to take away its power and its independence,"5 ° including the
judicial recall and measures to restrict the use of the injunc-
tion against secondary boycotts and to confer the right to a
jury trial in contempt proceedings.5' He reserved particular
acerbity for Roosevelt's "grotesque proposition" for recall of
decisions." While the Republican platform did not explicitly
mention Roosevelt's recall proposal, the G.O.P. promised to
maintain the "authority and integrity" of the state and fed-
eral courts, which the platform portrayed as the guardians of
civil liberties, political stability, and orderly progress."
Roosevelt's campaign, however, helped to call attention to
public discontent with the courts and provides a classic ex-
ample of how a presidential candidate can use an election to
encourage public dialogue about judicial issues. The fact that
Roosevelt's radical court reform proposal did not prevent Roo-
sevelt from obtaining twenty-eight percent of the popular vote
and eighty-eight electoral votes, the best showing of any third
party candidate during the twentieth century, provided at
least indirect evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with the
judiciary. This, in turn, may have emboldened Wilson to
nominate the liberal Louis D. Brandeis to the Court in 1916,
and may have encouraged the movement for what became the
Judiciary Act of 1914, which enabled federal courts to review
state decisions striking down social and economic regulatory
legislation. 4
49. William Howard Taft, Accepting the Republican Nomination for Presi-
dent of the United States (Aug. 1, 1912), in S. Doc. No. 902, at 5-6 (1912).
50. Id. at 10.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 10-11.
53. See 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15 at 184.
54. The Judiciary Act of 1914, 38 STAT. 790, permitted the federal courts to
hear appeals from state courts on all questions arising under the Constitution.
Federal law previously had permitted such appeals only when a state court de-
nied a right under the Constitution. When state courts during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries began striking down social and regulatory
legislation as violative of the Federal Constitution, federal courts could not hear
appeals because the decisions had upheld rather than denied a constitutional
right. Since federal courts sometimes were more receptive to regulatory legisla-
tion than were state courts, the Judiciary Act of 1914 was intended to help pre-
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F. The 1916 Election
The Supreme Court made a brief appearance in the 1916
campaign because Charles Evans Hughes resigned from the
Supreme Court to accept the Republican nomination for
president. Even though Hughes had actively resisted efforts
to draft him for the nomination, his immediate transforma-
tion from a presumably apolitical jurist to a partisan stan-
dard-bearer seemed to vindicate the allegations of progres-
sives and labor unions that judges were merely politicians in
robes. In resisting Republican efforts to nominate him,
Hughes had warned that his resignation from the Court
might weaken the independence of the judiciary and impair
public confidence in the incorruptibility of the courts.55
Even though Hughes left the bench with the blessing of
his brethren, Chief Justice Edward D. White feared that
Hughes' nomination would debase the Court's reputation.56
Similarly, The New York Times warned that Hughes' candi-
dacy threatened to corrupt "the integrity and reputation of
the Court."" Senate Democrats also expressed righteous in-
dignation. At least two senators proposed constitutional
amendments that would have limited political activity by
former Justices. Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana pre-
dicted that Hughes' nomination would forever cause Ameri-
cans to distrust the motives of federal judges in rendering
their decisions and would trigger demand for radical changes
vent state courts from strangling progressive measures. See ROSS, supra note
31, at 80-84.
55. See 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 300 (1951); 51 CONG.
REC. 11851 (1916).
56. See PUSEY, supra note 55, at 332 (quoting JAMES E. WATSON, AS I
KNEW THEM 164 (1936)).
57. Editorial, The Supreme Court and the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1916, at 10. The Times later lamented that Hughes' candidacy had broken the
"great tradition which permitted us to assume that the Justices upon that bench
were altogether and permanently removed from the brawls of partisan politics."
The Judge in Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1916, at 8.
58. Senator Joel Stone of Missouri, the chairman of the upcoming Demo-
cratic convention's Committee on Resolutions, proposed a constitutional
amendment to preclude Supreme Court Justices from becoming candidates for
public office within five years after their service on the bench. See Stone Raps
Hughes and Platforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1916, at 1. Senator Charles S.
Thomas of Colorado advocated an amendment to disqualify federal judges from
eligibility for any elective federal office during their judicial term and for two
years after the departure from the bench. See 51 CONG. REC. 11851 (1916).
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in judicial power."
The issue receded into the background of the presidential
campaign after Wilson refused to permit the Democratic plat-
form to condemn Hughes for his resignation. Although the
American Federation of Labor attacked Hughes's judicial rec-
ord, and workers in Indianapolis and Toledo heckled Hughes
over the Court's ruling against secondary boycotts in Loewe v.
Lawlor," Hughes' judicial record was not a major campaign
issue. The Democrats may have refrained in part from at-
tacking Hughes because Alton B. Parker had resigned from
the New York Court of Appeals in 1904 to accept the Demo-
cratic nomination for president.61 More significantly, Hughes'
irreproachable conduct during his final days on the bench and
the widespread recognition that the G.O.P. had turned to
Hughes as the one man who could reunite the party relieved
Hughes of any significant stigma of impropriety." These cir-
cumstances likewise spared the Court from any major attack.
As The Nation observed, "No argument can ever be drawn
from [Hughes'] career that the way to political preferment lies
through the courts."63 Professor Bickel concluded that the
hazards that the Hughes candidacy presented to the Court
were "negotiated with singular success and luck."64
G. The 1924 Election
Judicial issues perhaps played a more significant role in
the 1924 election campaign than in any other in the nation's
history. The resurgence of hostility toward social and eco-
nomic reform legislation by both state and federal courts
during the previous six years had inspired a renewal of pro-
posals among progressives and labor unions for curbing the
courts. In particular, the Supreme Court's decisions striking
59. See 51 CONG. REC. 11851 (1916).
60. See The Judge in Politics, supra note 57. In Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S.
274 (1908), decided before Hughes became a Supreme Court Justice in 1910, the
Court held that a secondary boycott by a labor union violated federal antitrust
laws.
61. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 162.
62. See id.
63. The Nomination of Hughes, THE NATION, June 15, 1916, at 635.
64. 9 Alexander M. Bickel & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States, in THE
JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 397 (1984).
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down the federal child labor laws65 and a statute regulating
wages for women in the District of Columbia" had convinced
many reformers that some type of diminution of judicial
power was needed in order to assure the success of the reform
agenda. Among the many Court-curbing measures advocated
by various politicians, academics, and commentators, two in
particular received the most widespread attention. The first
was Senator Robert M. LaFollette's proposal for allowing
Congress to override U.S. Supreme Court decisions by a two-
thirds vote. The second measure was 'Senator William E.
Borah's proposal to require concurrence of seven Justices to
strike down federal legislation.68
After the 1924 Republican national convention rejected
LaFollette's proposals to permit Congress to override Su-
preme Court decisions and to impose ten-year term limits on
federal judges, LaFollette became an independent candidate
for president. He received the endorsements of the Commit-
tee on Progressive Political Action ("CPPA"), the Socialist
Party, and the American Federation of Labor.69 Although the
CPPA did not formally adopt LaFollette's specific remedies
for curbing judicial power, the CPPA platform called gener-
ally for "[a]bolition of the tyranny and usurpation of the
courts, including the practice of nullifying legislation in con-
flict with the political, social, or economic theories of the
judges." ° The CPPA also advocated the election of all federal
judges for "limited terms."71 LaFollette's formidable support
among liberals, industrial workers, farmers, and ethnic
Americans frightened the Republicans, who were jolted by
polls during the summer of 1924 indicating that LaFollette
might siphon enough electoral votes from the G.O.P. in the
middle west to throw the election into the House of Represen-
tatives.72 In an attempt to portray LaFollette as a dangerous
radical who would undermine prosperity and precipitate so-
cial disorder, Republicans decided to make opposition to La-
65. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furni-
ture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1916).
66. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
67. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 193-217.
68. See id. at 218-32.
69. See id. at 255-56.
70. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 256.
71. Id.
72. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 259 n.28.
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Follette's judicial proposals a centerpiece of their campaign."
Republican vice presidential candidate Charles G. Dawes set
the tone in his acceptance speech at the G.O.P. convention in
July 1924, alleging that "LaFollette, leading the army of ex-
treme radicalism, has a platform demanding public owner-
ship of railroads and attacking our courts which are a funda-
mental and constitutional safeguard of American
citizenship."74 Dawes, who campaigned far more than Presi-
dent Calvin Coolidge, continued to warn against LaFollette's
proposal until election day."
President Coolidge likewise emphasized the Court issue
in two of his rare public appearances during the campaign.
He declared early in September that the Court proposal was
designed for "the confiscation of property and the destruction
of liberty" and that people would "see their savings swept
away, their homes devastated and their children perish from
want and hunger."76 Coolidge repeated these allegations in a
major address later in September.7 In a radio address ten
73. See id. at 260-61.
74. Charles G. Dawes, Acceptance Speech before the G.O.P. National Con-
vention (July 1924), in Text of Dawes's Speech Accepting Nomination, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1924, at 2.
75. As Dawes stated in his autobiography:
In my speech of acceptance I announced the constitutional issue pre-
cipitated by Senator LaFollette as the dominant one. Chairman Butler
was adverse to this course, feeling that the issue of economy should be
the one to be stressed. I sent my speech before delivery to President
Coolidge, who returned it without suggestion as to change, except that
he substituted "an important issue" for the "predominant issue" as a
caption to that portion of my address devoted to the LaFollette position
on the Constitution. From the time of delivery of the acceptance speech
... until the end of the campaign, during which I traveled fifteen thou-
sand miles... and made one hundred and eight speeches, I endeavored
to keep that issue in the minds of the people.
CHARLES G. DAWES, NOTES AS VICE PRESIDENT 1928-1929, at 19-20 (1935).
Throughout the campaign, Dawes continued to make his accusations to large
and enthusiastic crowds, and local Republican campaign managers and pro-
Republican newspapers increasingly emphasized the judicial issue. See ROSS,
supra note 31, at 262.
76. Coolidge Assails LaFollette Views on Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 1924, at 1.
77. See President Calvin Coolidge, Address delivered at the dedication of a
monument to Lafayette (Sept. 6, 1924), available at http://www.calvin-
coolidge.org/pages/history/speeches/aspres/240906.html; President Calvin Coo-
lidge, Speech on the Anniversary of the First Continental Congress (Sept. 25,
1924), available at http://www.calvin-coolidge.org/pages/history/speeches/
aspres/240925.html.
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days before the election, Coolidge warned that LaFollette's
proposal would "destroy the States, abolish the Presidential
office, close the courts and make the will of Congress abso-
lute.,,8
The Republican strategy of using the courts as a stick
with which to attack LaFollette received hearty praise from
Chief Justice Taft, who wrote to President Coolidge in Sep-
tember to commend the "wisdom and courage" of the Republi-
can decision to "force consideration of the issue of the Consti-
tution and the Court."79 Democrats also sometimes warned
against LaFollette's proposals in rhetoric that was scarcely
less apocalyptic than that used by Republicans," although
Democrats also frequently accused Republicans of exploiting
judicial issues in order to distract attention from scandals in
the Harding Administration.8'
Prominent members of the bar also attacked the court
proposal. Hughes, for example, warned that the proposal
would "denature the Supreme Court" and "destroy our system
of government." 2 Many of New York's leading attorneys
signed a statement alleging that the "LaFollette attack upon
our Constitution and the Supreme Court is but the first step
toward Socialism, Bolshevism and chaos" and that "[i]t would
be the death knell to the stability and to the prosperity and
happiness of millions of workers, honest Americans."83
As the campaign progressed, LaFollette appears to have
recognized that he could not win many votes by attacking the
courts. Although his proposals were very popular among
many of his core constituents, he understood that they might
offend more moderate voters and that Republican emphasis
on the issue might scare even some of his loyal supporters. In
particular, there was a danger that the proposal could erode
his ardent support among Midwestern Roman Catholics and
78. Coolidge States Views on Issue in Last Big Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1924, at 4.
79. Letter from William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the United States, to
Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Sept. 16, 1924) (on file with
Papers of William Howard Taft, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Se-
ries 3, Reel 267).
80. See id. Reel 268-69.
81. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 272.
82. Hughes in Chicago Promises Prosperity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1924, at 8.
83. Court Limitation Assailed by Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1924, at 6. For
other examples of attacks on the court plan by lawyers, see ROSS, supra note 31,
at 273-74.
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Lutherans, who looked to the federal courts for protection
against ethnic and religious discrimination in the wake of the
resurgent nativism that had followed the First World War.
The Supreme Court's 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,84
which nullified laws that prohibited the teaching of German
in private and parochial schools, was widely hailed among
ethnic Americans for striking against ethnic and religious
prejudice.85 Meyer also presaged judicial disapproval of a
widespread movement to destroy parochial education by re-
quiring all children to attend public school.86 A federal dis-
trict court's decision in March 1924 striking down Oregon's
compulsory public education law87 provided further evidence
that the same power that courts could use to nullify popular
social and economic regulatory legislation could also be used
to protect personal liberties from majoritarian tyranny.
LaFollette's opponents exploited the popularity of these
decisions in attacking LaFollette and made many implicit and
explicit references to these decisions throughout the cam-
paign. Accordingly, LaFollette attempted at first to ignore his
proposals for curbing judicial power.88 Nevertheless, when it
became clear that his opponents had no intention of muting
their attacks on his proposal, LaFollette began to address it.
LaFollette offered his first and most thorough defense of his
proposal at a Madison Square Garden rally on September 18.
After attacking the "private monopoly system," which he
wanted to make the centerpiece of his campaign, LaFollette
alleged that the major parties were trying to divert discussion
from "vital economic issues" by making "foolish and prepos-
terous assertions" that Progressives sought "to weaken or im-
pair" the federal courts." Although LaFollette vowed to wage
his campaign on economic issues, he explained that he would
84. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. See WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM,
EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 133 (1994).
86. See id. at 69-72, 171.
87. See Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary v. Pierce, 296
F. 928 (D. Or. 1924), affd, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
88. LaFollette did not mention the proposal in his first major campaign ad-
dress, which he delivered to a national radio audience on Labor Day. See ROSS,
supra note 31, at 267.
89. A transcript of LaFollette's Madison Square Garden address, together
with transcripts of most of LaFollette's other 1924 campaign speeches, are in
the LaFollette Family Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Series
B, Box 228.
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grudgingly discuss the court issue in order to respond to the
distortions of his opponents. After explaining that the people
would have the opportunity to duly consider a constitutional
amendment embodying his proposals, he discussed numerous
cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court had invalidated re-
form measures. "Always these decisions of the Court are on
the side of the wealthy and powerful and against the poor and
weak," LaFollette declared."
Although the crowds cheered LaFollette's initial volleys
against the courts, LaFollette apparently began to bore his
audience when he started discussing specific Supreme Court
decisions, and hundreds of persons vacated the auditorium
until LaFollette turned to other issues, with virtually no one
left in the arena.9' Although reaction to LaFollette's speech at
Madison Square Garden confirmed the popularity of court-
curbing among faithful Progressives, it also demonstrated
that the public lacked patience for any extensive discussion of
judicial issues. The lesson was not lost on LaFollette, who
discussed his views on judicial reform in only half of his re-
maining speeches and never again in so much detail.92
Even after LaFollette addressed his proposal publicly he
was hesitant to show full support for his position. Unable to
shed what increasingly resembled a political albatross, La-
Follette often seemed more anxious to assure his audiences of
the difficulty of enacting a court-curbing amendment than to
persuade them of the amendment's merits.93 In addition to
reminding voters of the obstacles faced by any constitutional
amendment, he conceded that few members of Congress sup-
ported the proposal and that few other sympathizers were
likely to be elected to Congress in 1924.94 LaFollette even dis-
tanced himself from his own proposal by pointing out that the
President has no formal role in the amendment process.9
90. Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Address at a Campaign Rally in Madison
Square Garden (Sept. 18, 1924) (on file with LaFollette Family Papers, supra
note 89).
91. See 14,000 Pack Garden, Cheer La Follette in Attack on Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1924, at 1; Letter from Arthur Garfield Hays to Robert M. La-
Follette, Jr. (Sept. 19, 1924) (on file with LaFollette Family Papers, supra note
89).
92. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 270-71.
93. See id. at 276.
94. See id. at 276-77.
95. See id. at 277.
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LaFollette likewise refrained from any personal criticism
of Chief Justice Taft or any other Justice,96 although his cam-
paign's handbook pointed out the irony that Taft served in
such a powerful appointive position after the people had
overwhelmingly defeated him for reelection to the presidency
in 1912.97 LaFollette's restraint is remarkable since Taft
surely must have been a tempting target because he had re-
ceived widespread vituperation a year earlier for accepting an
annuity under Andrew Carnegie's will.98 The few public at-
tempts of LaFollette's supporters to criticize individual
judges99 inspired adverse editorial comment. °° With only
slight exaggeration, a prominent attorney who was a personal
friend of Taft's remarked shortly before the election that La-
Follette's forces "never mentioned the name of Taft from be-
ginning to end." 1'
In his often rather tepid defenses of his court proposal,
LaFollette argued that judicial review was not foreseen by the
Framers, that judicial review of congressional legislation had
not been frequently exercised until relatively recently, that
Jefferson, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt had criticized ju-
dicial review, and that the judiciary's lack of this power had
not imperiled civil liberties in Great Britain.' In an appeal
to ethnic voters who sent their children to parochial schools,
he explained that his proposal would not have affected the
outcome of Meyer v. Nebraska because it would not have im-
96. See id. at 278-79. LaFollette's restraint came as a surprise and perhaps
a disappointment to Taft, who predicted with an apparent combination of resig-
nation and relish at the start of the campaign that LaFollette would indulge in
ad hominem vituperation. See Letter from William Howard Taft to Pierce But-
ler (Aug. 19, 1924) (on file with Taft Papers, supra note 79); Letter from William
Howard Taft to Henry W. Taft (Aug. 19, 1924) (on file with Taft Papers, supra
note 79); Letter from William Howard Taft to Gus Karger (July 18, 1924) (on
file with Taft Papers, supra note 79).
97. See ROBERT M. LAFOLLETTE, LEAFLET NO. 4, LAFOLLETTE AND THE
PROGRESSIVES ON THE COURTS (on file with LaFollette Family Papers, supra
note 89, Series B, Box 205). The handbook declared that "no one will contend
that by vote of the people Chief Justice Taft could have been elected to this
powerful office for life, but through a Presidential appointment it was possible
for him to write the opinion which nullified the Child Labor law." Id.
98. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 234-40.
99. See, e.g., LaFollette Group Defends Court Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1924, at 3.
100. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 278-79.
101. Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to William Howard Taft (Nov. 1, 1924)
(on file with Taft Papers, supra note 79, Reel 268).
102. See id. at 277.
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paired the Supreme Court's power to review the constitution-
ality of state legislation."3 LaFollette likewise disparaged the
Republican argument that the Court was a temple of civil lib-
erties. Recalling that neither the Supreme Court nor any
other federal court "came to the rescue of the liberties of the
people" when Congress enacted repressive legislation during
the First World War, LaFollette declared that "the people
themselves are sovereign and that it is unsafe for them to en-
trust their liberties in the hands of judges or any other offi-
cials appointed for life and responsible to no one."" 4 Accord-
ing to LaFollette, "[i]n all the history of the world, no people
has ever looked to the courts as the guardian of its liberties.
The liberties of the people rest with the people.""'
Although Coolidge won re-election in a landslide, LaFol-
lette won more than one-sixth of the votes, carrying his home
state of Wisconsin and running ahead of the Democrats in
eleven other states. No third-party presidential candidate
would poll so many votes again until 1992. Party loyalty and
prosperity probably would have ensured Coolidge's victory
even if the Republicans had not attacked LaFollette's court-
curbing plan with such immense zeal. LaFollette's ability to
win so many votes in the face of the onslaught against his
court plan indicates that a remarkably large number of voters
either approved of it or were unduly alarmed by it. The court
proposals, however, probably cost LaFollette a significant
number of votes and may have prevented him from carrying
several midwestern states in which he polled nearly as many
votes as Coolidge. A study of the 1924 campaign has con-
cluded that "the Supreme Court issue, more than anything
else, was responsible for the ease with which the Republicans
convinced a large segment of the American voting population
of the imminent danger to the Constitution.""6 Similarly, in
the wake of the election, The New Republic stated that "the
natural timidity of a wealthy nation in a poverty-stricken
world was accentuated by a whipped-up panic over the sup-
103. Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Speech in Omaha, Nebraska (transcript
on file with LaFollette Family Papers, supra note 89).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. KENNETH C. MACKAY, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT OF 1924, at 163
(Octagon Books 1966) (1947).
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posed danger to the Supreme Court and the Constitution.""°7
And the popular journalist Mark Sullivan wrote shortly after
the election that "LaFollette suffered greatly through drama-
tizing himself in opposition to the Supreme Court."'' 8
The 1924 campaign has provided an enduring lesson in
the political hazards of criticizing the Court even when the
Court is unpopular with large segments of the population.
Never again has any major presidential candidate supported
a proposal for curbing the Court's powers. Even in times
when the Court's decisions have been widely unpopular, par-
ticularly 1936, 1964, and 1968, candidates have generally
limited themselves to promising to nominate candidates who
would overturn these decisions.
H. The 1928 Election
Judicial issues were not prominent in the 1928 campaign
inasmuch as controversy over the Court subsided for several
years after the 1924 election. Organized efforts to curtail ju-
dicial power diminished in part because of LaFollette's failure
to ignite interest in Court-curbing and the Republicans' suc-
cessful efforts to make Court-bashing seem unpatriotic, if not
treasonous. Efforts to curb the Court also declined because
the Court was more receptive toward economic reform legisla-
tion and it started to become a guardian of personal liber-
ties."09 Mark Sullivan reported that the Court "never was
mentioned even faintly as even the most minor kind of an is-
sue" during the 1928 presidential campaign." °
I. The 1932 Election
The Great Depression overshadowed all other issues in
the 1932 election. The judiciary was not an issue even though
economic suffering may have aggravated public discontent
with the conservatism of the federal courts. The failure of the
Supreme Court to emerge as an issue in this campaign is par-
107. THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1924, at 1.
108. Mark Sullivan, Looking Back on LaFollette, THE WORLD'S WORK, Jan.
1925, at 331.
109. See ROSS, supra note 31, at 285-90.
110. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dis-
sent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267, 1318 n.163 (2001) (quoting Mark Sullivan, Public Esteem for Court
Called Aid to Hughes, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 6, 1930, at 9).
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ticularly notable since the bruising battles over President
Hoover's nominations of John J. Parker and Charles Evans
Hughes in 1930 had dramatically called attention to the
President's ability to shape public policy through his ap-
pointment of Supreme Court Justices. Parker's nomination
produced history's first large-scale mobilization of public in-
terest groups in opposition to a Supreme Court nomination
when civil rights organizations, labor unions, and assorted
liberals persuaded the Senate to reject Parker. Although the
American Civil Liberties Union's founder had contended in
the wake of Parker's defeat that few persons perceived how
significantly the President's selection of Justices influenced
the "social life of future generations,""' the firestorm over the
nomination demonstrated that many persons recognized the
importance of the appointment power. In particular, Progres-
sives who opposed Hughes' nomination to the Chief Justice-
ship complained bitterly about the President's power to influ-
ence the Court's direction into the far distant future.
This fervor over the judicial nomination process that
characterized the Hughes and Parker battles, however, did
not find expression in the presidential campaign two and a
half years later, perhaps because immediate obsession with
the Depression displaced interest in the type of long-term re-
form legislation that the Court could sustain or nullify. Al-
though it was virtually inevitable that the Court eventually
would need to review the constitutionality of anti-Depression
measures enacted during the next Administration, concern
about how the Court would respond to activist legislation was
subordinated to discussion of strategies for ending the De-
pression.
Aside from a platform pledge "for a comprehensive re-
form in judicial procedure to eliminate legal technicalities
and to secure speedy and substantial justice, and the aboli-
tion of unjust injunctions," the Democratic platform was
largely silent about judicial issues."2  The Socialist Party's
platform advocated abolition of the Court's power to review
the constitutionality of federal legislation and an amendment
111. Letter from Roger S. Baldwin to William E. Borah (May 13, 1930) (on
file with Papers of William E. Borah, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box 301).
112. See 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 339.
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"to make constitutional amendments less cumbersome."113
Facing almost certain defeat, the Republicans tried in
vain to portray Roosevelt as a dangerous radical. Frustrated
by the prudence of Roosevelt's public pronouncements, Re-
publicans were temporarily elated late in October when Roo-
sevelt alleged that the G.O.P. controlled the Supreme Court
since a majority of the Justices were Republican in their poli-
tics. Although Roosevelt's remark was off-hand and not part
of any general attack on the Court,"' the G.O.P. seized on it
as evidence of Roosevelt's intention to subvert the Constitu-
tion. Denouncing Roosevelt's allegation as "atrocious," Hoo-
ver reminded voters that his most recent appointee to the
Court was a Democrat, Benjamin Cardozo. Hoover declared
that any suggestion of political influence over the Supreme
Court was contrary to American tradition, and he asked
whether his opponent "would expect the Court to be subservi-
ent to him and the Democratic Party.""5 William Nelson
Cromwell, a leader of the New York bar, urged Roosevelt to
retract his remark, declaring that "[nlo greater harm can be
done to our national institutions or to the cause of justice
than to attempt to drag that court into the arena of poli-
tics.""6 Although the New York Times admitted that Roose-
velt's statement was "needless and foolish," the Times pointed
out that the G.O.P. demigod Theodore Roosevelt had not hesi-
tated to criticize the courts and dismissed Republican outrage
as "highly artificial.""7 The Times was probably accurate in
its prediction that Roosevelt's gaffe would "not have the
slightest effect upon the presidential campaign. '  The furor
113. Id. at 353. The platform also advocated amendments for the direct elec-
tion of the President and Vice President and the initiative and referendum. See
id. It further proposed a "worker's rights amendment" empowering Congress to
establish national systems of unemployment, health and accident insurance,
abolish child labor, and nationalize major industries. See id.
114. Roosevelt had added this remark to a prepared address. See WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83 (1995). Roosevelt later told James
Byrnes, "What I said last night about the judiciary is true, and whatever is in a
man's heart is apt to come to his tongue - I shall not make any explanations or
apology for it!" Id.
115. Hoover In Direct Attack On Roosevelt Charges 'New Deal' Is Now A
"Shuffle;" Scores Remark On Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1932, at 1.
116. Assails "Aspersion" On Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1932, at 16.
117. Id.
118. Editorial, Praying for a "Break," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1932, at 18.
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over Roosevelt's remark, however, provided another demon-
stration of the political dangers of criticizing the Court in
election campaigns.
J. The 1936 Election
The controversy over the Supreme Court's nullification of
much New Deal legislation during 1935 and 1936119 should
have transformed the Court into a major election issue in
1936. Frustrated over the Court's hostility toward reform
legislation, a number of Roosevelt's supporters urged the
President and his advisors to make the Court an election is-
sue.12° Others voters, perhaps remembering how criticism of
119. See, e.g., Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating
part of the National Recovery Act); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (invalidating the Frazier-Lemke Emergency Farm
Mortgage Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (in-
validating the Bituminous Coal Act); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Im-
provement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (invalidating the Municipal Bankruptcy
Act).
120. See, e.g., Letter from Norman Hapgood to Franklin D. Roosevelt (re-
ceived by the White House on Feb. 24, 1936) (on file with Presidential Personal
File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Folder 2278); Letter
from Donald R. Richberg to Marvin H. McIntyre (June 16, 1936) (on file with
Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 165); Letter from
William P. Zehner to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Apr. 24, 1936) (on file with Presi-
dential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 274, Box 2);
Letter from Charles Belous to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Apr. 27, 1936) (on file with
Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 274, Box
2); Letter from A.G. Drumm, Jr. to Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 29, 1936) (on file
with Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 274,
Box 2); Memorandum regarding letter from Daniel L. Smith (June 22, 1936) (on
file with Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File
274, Box 2). Exhorting Roosevelt to propose in his re-nomination speech a con-
stitutional amendment that would guarantee the survival of New Deal legisla-
tion, one voter declared, "You can't side-step the issue." Letter from Earl R.
Salley to Franklin D. Roosevelt (June 5,1936) (on file with Presidential Personal
File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 274, Box 2). Complaining of
"judicial dictatorship," another voter suggested that Roosevelt avoid charges of
disrespect to the Court by quoting Justice Stone's dissents in a campaign
against the Court. "The Supreme Court has taken enough rope to hang itself in
public opinion," he contended. Letter from Paul Webb to Franklin D. Roosevelt
(June 4,1936) (on file with Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Li-
brary, Official File 41a, Box 54). Still another correspondent urged Roosevelt to
make a statement unequivocally affirming his respect for the Court but an-
nouncing that the Democratic Party would use all available constitutional
means to continue to pursue its reform agenda in the face of judicial opposition.
See Memorandum regarding letter from Samuel J. Cohen (Jan. 25, 1936) (on file
with Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 274,
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the Court had hurt LaFollette in 1924, warned Roosevelt to
avoid the issue until after he had secured a mandate in the
election. 2' One voter, for example, urged the President to
remain silent on judicial issues during the campaign in order
to avoid supplying ammunition to the "constitution criers." 22
And a Brooklyn attorney believed that the constitutional con-
vention that he advocated should be deferred to 1937 since "to
discuss any particular constitutional amendment during the
coming presidential campaign would be a tactical blunder and
a hopeless undertaking from every standpoint."
123
The Democrats chose to follow this more prudent course.
Although there is considerable evidence that Roosevelt knew
before the 1936 election that he would propose some type of
measure after the election to circumvent the Court's hostility
toward the New Deal, 24 Roosevelt refrained from any broad-
sides against the Court during the campaign, limiting himself
to discreet hints that Court reform might be part of his post-
election agenda. 25 As Professor Leuchtenberg has observed,
Roosevelt believed that an election year "was not the propi-
tious moment to give the opposition, which was bereft of is-
sues, an opportunity to stand by the flag."26  Roosevelt,
Leuchtenberg explains, "wanted the campaign to center not
on the Constitution but on the many achievements of the New
Deal and the past iniquities of Herbert Hoover." 27 Accord-
ingly, the Democratic platform was circumspect, vowing cau-
tiously and rather enigmatically that the party would seek a
constitutional amendment to clarify the power of Congress
and the state legislatures to enact laws to safeguard economic
security if the nation's economic problems could not effec-
tively be solved "through legislation within the Constitu-
Box 2).
121. See Memorandum regarding letter from Frank J. Burns (June 18, 1936)
(on file with Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Office
File 274, Box 2).
122. Memorandum concerning letter from Jacob Hayman (Feb. 24, 1936) (on
file with Presidential Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File
274, Box 2).
123. Letter from F.R. Serri to Franklin D. Roosevelt (on file with Presidential
Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 274, Box 2).
124. See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 114, at 98-114.
125. See STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 149-50.
126. LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 114, at 98.
127. Id. at 107.
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tion. ,, 28
Democratic reticence about judicial issues did not en-
tirely discourage Republicans from warning that victorious
Democrats would tamper with the Court. Early in 1936, Re-
publican Senator William E. Borah of Idaho attempted to
make judicial independence and constitutional integrity an
issue in his campaign for the G.O.P. presidential nomination.
Borah emphasized that the courts protected personal liberties
as well as property rights, and he warned that abridgement of
judicial powers would lead to despotism. 9
Republican plans to exploit Democratic criticism of the
Court were frustrated, however, in June 1936, when the
Court struck down a New York minimum wage law in More-
head v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo.3 ° Morehead created con-
flict between the Republican Party's advocacy of states' rights
and its defenses of the Court.131 Decided on the eve of the Re-
publican National Convention, Morehead may have forced
G.O.P. strategists to mute the importance of judicial issues. 32
Leading Republicans, including the party's presidential
nominee, Kansas Governor Alfred Landon, called for a consti-
tutional amendment to permit state maximum hours laws,
and the Republican platform supported state minimum
wages, which the platform somehow contended could be en-
acted "within the Constitution as it now stands." 34 According
to Professor Lasser, "[tihe Republican Party was now as op-
posed to the Court as the Democratic Party, or at least so it
128. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 362. Democratic lead-
ers resisted advice to advocate specific Court-curbing measures, such as the
seven-to-two vote for invalidation of legislation that Senator Borah had pro-
posed in 1922. See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 114, at 106.
129. See Senator William E. Borah, Address to Brooklyn Republicans, in Text
of Senator William E. Borah's Address to Brooklyn Republicans, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1936, at 13; Senator William E. Borah, Address on the Constitution and
Entangling Alliances, in Text of Senator Borah's Address on "The Constitution
and Entangling Alliances," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1936, at 32; Senator William E.
Borah, Address Opening Campaign in Illinois, in Text of Senator Borah's Ad-
dress Opening Campaign in His Native State of Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1936, at 40.
130. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
131. See LASSER, supra note 11, at 142. As Professor Lasser points out, "two
positions which until Morehead had been mutually reinforcing . . . were now
suddenly in conflict." Id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 143.
134. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 367.
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seemed, and any chance of campaigning as the party of the
Court and of the Constitution was shattered."'35
The 1936 Republican campaign, however, did not aban-
don all efforts to stigmatize the Democrats for their criticism
of the Court and their experimentation with the Constitution.
The G.O.P. platform pledged to "resist all attempts to impair
the authority of the Supreme Court" inasmuch as "[t] here can
be no individual liberty without an independent judiciary.' 136
Robert A. Taft, the son of the late President and Chief Jus-
tice, predicted that Roosevelt, if reelected, would probably
have the opportunity to appoint a majority of the Justices,
who would reject "fixed principles of constitutional law" and
simply "construe the Constitution as the executive wants it
construed."13 7 This, Taft alleged, presented "greater dangers
to the Constitution than any which it has ever faced.' 38
Three months after his landslide re-election, Roosevelt
announced his Court-packing plan, which failed resound-
135. LASSER, supra note 11, at 142.
136. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 366.
137. Robert A. Taft, Sidestepping the Constitution, REVIEW OF REVIEWS,
Sept. 1936, at 37.
138. Id. A few days before the election, a Salt Lake City newspaper urged its
readers to vote for Landon because Roosevelt had endangered the Constitution
by advocating unconstitutional legislation and failing to promise that he would
"not continue to carry out the principles of his earlier legislation which the Su-
preme Court had declared unconstitutional." Editorial, The Constitution, THE
DESERET NEWS, Oct. 31, 1936 (clipping in Presidential Personal File, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library, Official File, Box 2). The editorial reportedly caused more
than 1500 Mormons to cancel their subscriptions. See Letter from William H.
Hornibrook to James A. Farley (Nov. 2, 1936) (on file with Presidential Personal
File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File, Box 2). Meanwhile, Republi-
can vice presidential nominee Frank Knox suggested that Roosevelt might have
plans for "assaulting the Supreme Court." Calls Roosevelt to Bare Wage Aim,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1936, at 18. Former President Hoover in an election-eve
address presciently asked whether the President intended to "stuff the court."
Hoover 'Rejected' New Deal Ideas; Held they would Shackle Liberty, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1936, at 1; Herbert Hoover, Address Warning of New Deal 'Shackles on
Liberty, in The Text of Hoover's Denver Address Warning of New Deal 'Shackles
on Liberty,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1936, at 4. Similarly, Landon accused Roose-
velt of deliberately attempting to "break down the confidence of our people in
the independence of the Supreme Court" and of regarding the Court "as minor
barrier to be circumvented if it can't be hurdled." LASSER, supra note 11, at 145
(quoting N.Y. TIMES, Oct.24, 1936, at 8 and Oct. 22, 1936, at 21). As Professor
Lasser points out, however, "[slince Landon could charge Roosevelt with no spe-
cific act of defiance against the Court, and since Roosevelt claimed to support
the Constitution fully, these charges appeared to be made more in desperation
at the end of a difficult campaign than anything else." LASSER, supra note 11,
at 145.
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ingly" 9 despite the unprecedented size of Roosevelt's landslide
in the 1936 election. Although one scholar has argued that
Roosevelt ought to have advocated Court reform during the
campaign so that he could have claimed a mandate for it after
he won the election,'4 ° he aptly concedes that "[fior Roosevelt
to attack the Supreme Court in the 1936 campaign would
have been risky," since the issue could have backfired and
"made his reelection so narrow that he could not persuasively
claim a mandate for Court reform afterward."'4 ' Such an at-
tack would have seemed particularly dangerous at the time,
since not even the most optimistic Democrats foresaw the size
of Roosevelt's landslide, and at least one major poll forecast
his defeat.'42
The reluctance of Roosevelt to make the Court an issue in
1936 provides a prime example of the hesitation of presiden-
tial candidates to criticize the Court even when the Court is a
subject of major controversy. The recognition of Democrats
during the 1936 campaign that any attack on the Court could
provoke hostility from voters foreshadowed the negative pub-
lic reaction to Roosevelt's Court-packing proposal during the
following year. Roosevelt could have avoided much embar-
rassment if he had been as circumspect in addressing judicial
issues after the 1936 campaign as he was during that cam-
paign, although his plan arguably was successful to the ex-
tent that it may have influenced the Court's decision-making
process.
K. The 1940 Election
The unpopularity of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan even
among many ardent New Deal Democrats had the potential
to provide a potent issue for Republicans in the 1940 election.
The widespread opinion that Roosevelt had overstepped the
boundaries of his power in trying to tamper with the Court
may have helped to elect more Republicans to Congress in the
1938 mid-term elections.'43 By the autumn of 1940, however,
139. See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 114, at 148-54.
140. See Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the
Court-packing Episode of 1937, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 267, 288 (1988).
141. Id. at 289.
142. See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 114, at 107.
143. See DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND WENDELL
WILLKIE 30 (1960).
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Roosevelt's Court-packing plan had been dead for three and a
half years, and the Court's deference toward New Deal legis-
lation had removed any chance that Roosevelt would attack
the Court again. Republicans therefore could no longer easily
allege that the Democrats threatened the Court's integrity.
Moreover, it would have been pointless as well as hypocritical
for Republicans to propose their own Court-curbing legisla-
tion since only a stronger Court could resist reform legisla-
tion. Although Republicans might have promised voters that
a G.O.P. President would appoint Justices who would renew
the resistance to liberal legislation, Roosevelt's appointment
of five liberal Justices to the Court seemed to assure that the
Court would continue to approve reform legislation. Fur-
thermore, public support for such liberal legislation had be-
come so widespread by 1940 that the Republican strategy be-
gan to focus more on administration of the regulatory state
rather than on its curtailment.
Although judicial issues thus were not prominent during
the 1940 election campaign, Republicans continued to warn
that the New Deal was disturbing the balance of powers by
concentrating undue power in the federal government, par-
ticularly the presidency. Roosevelt's bid for an unprecedented
third term provided Republicans with an especially potent
example of this alleged threat to constitutional government.
The Republican platform called for an amendment providing
that no person should serve as President for more than two
terms. 
14
As part of their warnings about the threat to the balance
of powers, Republicans emphasized the success of Roosevelt's
efforts to appoint judges who were sympathetic to the New
Deal. In a Saturday Evening Post article in March 1940,
Wendell L. Willkie, a utility attorney who later became the
G.O.P. nominee, suggested that Roosevelt's Supreme Court
appointees, who comprised a majority of the Court, were little
more than Roosevelt's puppets. Complaining that the Court
had "uprooted and overturned some of the oldest guideposts
of our constitutional law," Willkie contended that the Court's
"astonishing emancipation of legislative power from judicial
144. See 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 394. In modified
form, this amendment was enacted in 1951 as the Twenty Second Amendment.
Ironically, its principal impact has been to bar third terms by the popular Re-
publican presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan.
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restraint" would impede economic stability by creating an "ut-
ter inability ... to predict what precedents will be knocked
down next."'45 The article provoked an angry response from
Attorney General (and later Justice) Robert H. Jackson, who
decried "this sudden attack upon the Supreme Court by
spokesmen for the public utility interests" and condemned
Willkie's allegations of political influence on the justices as
"grossly inaccurate."'46 After winning the nomination, Willkie
continued to warn that Roosevelt's appointment of five new
Supreme Court Justices greatly aggrandized Roosevelt's
power since the new Justices were subservient to the Presi-
dent.
As part of their warnings about the threat to judicial in-
dependence, Republicans sometimes reminded voters of the
Court-packing plan. But while Roosevelt's proposal had
damaged Roosevelt politically in 1937, the memories of most
voters are short and Republicans probably recognized that
there was little hope of rekindling passions over a furor that
had burned itself out three years earlier. Willkie referred to
the Court-packing plan in a number of his public addresses,
but did not emphasize it and generally tried to link it to the
broader issues of his campaign. In a speech in San Francisco
in September, for example, Willkie alleged that the contro-
versy over the Court had contributed to the eruption of the
war in Europe. The "totally unexpected and unnecessary con-
troversy about the Supreme Court split America in two,"
Willkie declared.'4 7 "Congress became preoccupied with the
defense of the Constitution. While Hitler's power increased
from day to day, we presented to the world the spectacle of a
great people, the greatest of all democracies, torn asunder by
a broil over one of our most fundamental principles."'48 Wil-
lkie likewise used the intense opposition encountered by the
Court-packing plan to underscore the dangers of Roosevelt's
successful packing of the Court through deaths and retire-
ments. Recalling that Roosevelt "attacked the Supreme
145. Wendell L. Willkie, The Court Is Now His, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Mar. 9, 1940, at 29, 71, 76.
146. Hits Willkie Article on High Court Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1940,
at 46.
147. Willkie Charges New Deal Policies Helped Bring War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 1940, at 1.
148. Id.
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Court-the chief remaining obstacle between him and virtu-
ally unlimited power," Willkie expressed satisfaction that "the
people turned back this frontal attack upon the court," but he
declared that "time and mortality have given Mr. Roosevelt
his way."149 Likewise, the Republican platform alleged that
"the Administration has sought the subjection of the Judici-
ary to Executive discipline and domination."'5 °
Although the issue of judicial independence probably had
little direct impact on the outcome of the 1940 election, the
related issue of aggrandizement of presidential power almost
certainly cost Roosevelt votes. The 1940 presidential cam-
paign therefore provides an example of how judicial issues of-
ten become blurred with other constitutional and political
questions.
L. The 1944 Election
Although Roosevelt's bid for an unprecedented fourth
term in 1944 resurrected many of the same constitutional
concerns that had surrounded his third-term candidacy in
1940, the issue of separation of powers was less prominent.
Once voters had shattered the two-term tradition, there was
little reason to suppose that masses of voters would have any
inherent objection to yet another term.'5' Republican nominee
Thomas E. Dewey nevertheless emphasized the fourth term
issue indirectly by insisting that the Roosevelt Administra-
tion had grown tired and corrupt after eleven years.'52 In a
149. Wendell L. Wilkie, Address at the Herald Tribune Forum, in Text of
Wendell L. Willkie's Address at the Herald Tribune Forum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1940, at 16.
150. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 389. In addition to
decrying Roosevelt's appointment of five Justices during the previous three
years, Republicans also pointed out that Roosevelt had succeeded in packing the
lower federal courts. By the 1940 election, Roosevelt had named thirty-six of
the fifty-six circuit judges and seventy-nine of the 161 district court judges
during his two terms. Former Republican Senator George Wharton Pepper of
Pennsylvania called attention to these statistics on the eve of the 1940 election,
and the New York Times declared that "it is highly undesirable that all new
men be chosen by one President." Editorial, Judges and the Third Term, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1940, at 14.
151. Moreover, Republicans may have recognized the problem with empha-
sizing the danger of dictatorship when the United States was in the middle of a
war to crush dictators abroad.
152. See Thomas E. Dewey, Address in Chicago Pledging Honesty in Gov-
ernment, in The Text of Gov. Dewey's Address in Chicago Pledging Honesty in
Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1944, at 13.
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speech near the end of the campaign, for example, he re-
minded voters of Roosevelt's attempt to obtain "an obedient
Supreme Court" through the Court-packing plan.' In a more
direct warning about the concentration of power in Roose-
velt's hands, Dewey went on to declare that "time and mor-
tality and twelve years in office have enabled Mr. Roosevelt to
pack the courts with New Deal appointees. The very preser-
vation of our liberty demands that this practice be stopped-
and that's another reason why it's time for a change.'' 4
M. The 1948, 1952, 1956, and 1960 Elections
Judicial issues were not prominent in presidential cam-
paigns from 1948 through 1960, despite growing constitu-
tional controversies, particularly those involving desegrega-
tion.
In 1948, hostility among some Southern Democrats to-
ward the increasingly liberal policies of the Democratic Party
and the Truman Administration on racial issues led to the
formation of the States' Rights Party."' This party's platform
complained that the executive branch of government was
"promoting the gradual but certain growth of a totalitarian
state by domination and control of a politically minded Su-
preme Court.""6  In particular, the platform criticized (al-
though not specifically by name) the Court's decisions re-
quiring desegregation of law schools15 and participation by
non-whites in primary elections;158 barring the enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants;159 prohibiting religious instruc-
tion on public school premises; 6' and extending federal juris-
diction over submerged oil-bearing lands in California."'
Nevertheless, judicial issues do not appear to have been par-
ticularly prominent during the campaign, and do not appear
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Thurmond's States' Rights Party carried four Southern States and won
one-fifth of the vote in the states of the Old Confederacy. See KARI
FREDERICKSON, THE DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH,
1932-1968, at 184 (2001).
156. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 467.
157. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd.
of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
158. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
159. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
160. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
161. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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to have influenced the election's outcome."'
After being virtually ignored in 1952, judicial issues
arose briefly in politics during early 1956, in a much-
publicized but ultimately insignificant flap over Vice Presi-
dent Richard Nixon's apparent effort to claim Brown v. Board
of Education" as a Republican achievement. In extolling the
accomplishments of the Eisenhower Administration at a Re-
publican Club dinner in New York City on February 13, 1956,
Nixon declared that "speaking for a unanimous Supreme
Court, a great Republican Chief Justice, Earl Warren, has or-
dered an end to racial segregation in the nation's schools."64
Nixon's effort to win political credit for the Republican Party
for the Brown decision embarrassed many Republicans, pro-
vided grist for the segregationist mill of Southern Democrats,
and provoked sharp rebukes from the press.'65 Senators John
Stennis of Mississippi and Olin Johnston of South Carolina
chortled that Nixon's remark acknowledged and confirmed
that Brown was a political decision.'66
The controversy over Nixon's speech was badly timed for
Nixon, whose prospects for re-nomination were clouded dur-
ing the winter of 1956. Although Eisenhower officially de-
clined to comment directly on Nixon's remark, he stated in a
162. See, e.g., KARABELL, supra note 2.
163. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
164. Richard Nixon, Address to the Republican Club Dinner (Feb. 13, 1956),
in Text of Nixon's Address to the Republican Club Dinner Here, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1956, at 18. Professor Lasser has pointed out that
What is most striking about this incident is that Nixon would want to
invoke the chief justice's name and his decision in Brown in support of
the Republican Party. Nixon's support of Warren and Brown is sur-
prising only in retrospect, however; at the time, neither Warren nor
Brown was in disrepute except among extremist Southern Democrats.
LASSER, supra note 11, at 167.
165. For example, the New York Times warned that statements such as
Nixon's "feed the fires of the die-hards; weaken the authority and the prestige of
the court; reinforce the will to resist; heighten emotions that are already dan-
gerously high; and enhance the crudest kind of political partisanship." Edito-
rial, Bad Taste and Bad History, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1956, at 28. Adlai Stev-
enson denounced Nixon for "callously violat[ing] the cherished independence of
the Supreme Court" and warned against cynical politicians who work to gain
votes by pitting angry men against each other." Stevenson Scores Nixon on Tac-
tics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1956, at 10. Meanwhile, Carmine G. De Sapio, New
York Secretary of State and a leader of Tammany Hall Democrats, accused
Nixon of making "reckless political capital of racial prejudice." De Sapio Attacks
Nixon on 'Rights,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1956, at 26.
166. See 102 CONG. REC. 2556 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Stennis); id. at 3705
(remarks of Sen. Johnston).
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televised speech that he would never apply "a political desig-
nation" to any member of the Supreme Court.'67 Nixon's in-
discretion may have contributed to Eisenhower's initial un-
willingness to endorse Nixon's re-nomination and helped to
propel the "dump Nixon" movement of early 1956. Although
Stennis contended that Nixon's remark "put the Chief Justice
and the decision right in the middle of the forthcoming politi-
cal campaign," "' the incident was soon nearly forgotten. The
Democratic platform condemned "the efforts by the Republi-
can Party to make it appear that this tribunal [the Court] is a
part of the Republican Party,""9 but judicial issues played lit-
tle part in the presidential campaign. Meanwhile,
Eisenhower rejected language in an initial draft of the Re-
publican platform that gave the Eisenhower Administration
credit for Brown.7 °
The 1956 Republican platform rather backhandedly en-
dorsed the desegregation decisions, stating that the party "ac-
cepted" the original Brown decision and "concurred" in the
Court's later decision'7' that desegregation should be imple-
mented with "all deliberate speed."'72 The platform also con-
demned the use of force or violence to oppose desegregation
and declared that racial "progress must be encouraged and
the work of the courts supported in every legal manner by all
branches of the Federal Government.
The 1956 Democratic platform likewise called for an end
to racial discrimination and rejected "all proposals for the use
of force to interfere with the orderly determination of these
matters by the courts."74 With regard to Brown, the Demo-
167. See W.H. Lawrence, 2d Spot in Doubt: Foes of Vice President Now May
Push Drive to Block Him, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1956, at 1.
168. 102 CONG. REc. 2556 (1956).
169. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 542.
170. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
62 (2000). According to Professor Powe, Eisenhower personally vetoed the draft
of the platform on the official ground that the executive branch should not take
credit for what the co-equal judicial branch did and possibly because he believed
the decision a huge mistake and therefore wanted no association with it. See id.
171. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
172. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 554. The platform de-
clared that "[tihe implementation order of the Supreme Court recognizes the
complex and acutely emotional problems created by its decision in certain sec-
tions of our country where racial patterns have been developed in accordance
with prior and longstanding decisions of the same tribunal." Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 542.
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cratic platform was studiously ambiguous, stating the obvious
point that "[r]ecent decisions of the Supreme Court ... relat-
ing to segregation in public schools and elsewhere have
brought consequences of vast importance to our Nation as a
whole and especially to communities directly affected."'75 In a
bow toward opponents of desegregation who claimed that the
Court overstepped itself in Brown, the platform "emphati-
cally" reaffirmed the party's "support of the historic principle
that ours is a government of laws and not men," and it ex-
pressed its recognition that the Court was "one of three Con-
stitutional and coordinate branches of the Federal Govern-
ment."'76 As Professor Powe has observed, "[t]he Democratic
platform, reflecting the racial split within the party between
its northern wing and its often solid southern base, tried to
have it every possible way."'77
The Supreme Court had another connection with the
1956 election insofar as Eisenhower nominated William J.
Brennan, a Roman Catholic Democrat, to the Court in Octo-
ber in an effort to reach out to Catholics and Democrats in his
bid for reelection.
78
Judicial issues likewise played little role in the 1960 elec-
tion despite the growing intensity of the civil rights move-
ment, with which the Court was closely associated, and the
furor over the Court's decisions on subversion during 1956-
571 79 Although the 1960 Republican platform reminded vot-
ers that the Eisenhower Administration had "supported the
position of the Negro school children before the Supreme
Court" in Brown, and it declared that "the Supreme Court
school decision should be carried out in accordance with the
mandate of the Court," Democrats generally preferred to con-
tinue to avoid mentioning the Court in the context of presi-
dential politics.8 The absence of judicial issues in the 1960
campaign may partly reflect the tendency of the Court after
1958 to avoid highly controversial decisions.'
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. POWE, supra note 170.
178. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 262-63.
179. See PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969,
at 322-33 (1972).
180. 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 618.
181. See WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 237-39 (1962); POWE, supra note 170, at
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N. The 1964 Campaign
In 1964, the Supreme Court became a major issue in a
presidential campaign for the first time since 1924. A spate
of controversial U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 1962
and 1964 on such sensitive subjects as religion in the schools,
criminal rights, and reapportionment 8 2 had provoked intense
hostility among political conservatives. These decisions
greatly aggravated animosities created during the previous
decade by the Court's decisions on desegregation, criminal
justice, and protection of Communists. In the midst of such
controversy, the Court's emergence as an election issue was
almost inevitable. As an irate Alabama citizen warned Jus-
tice Douglas in 1963, "there is a day of reckoning coming and
it may well start with next year's elections when many of us
never thought that it was important for our wives and sons
and daughters to register and vote will now insist that they
do so."'3
Alabama Governor George C. Wallace energetically in-
terjected the Court into his campaign for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1964, denouncing the Court for its
decisions on desegregation, school prayer and Bible reading,
reapportionment, and criminal justice. Although Wallace had
no chance of wresting the nomination from President John-
son, his surprisingly large vote tallies in many non-Southern
states, particularly Wisconsin, demonstrated that public at-
tacks on the Court might win votes. Wallace continued to ex-
coriate the courts in speeches throughout the nation during
1964 even after he had abandoned his presidential bid.14 In
177.
182. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (forbidding prayer in pub-
lic school); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (forbidding use of the Bi-
ble for devotional exercises in public schools); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(holding that reapportionment was a justiciable issue); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring reapportionment of congressional districts); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring reapportionment of both houses of
state legislatures); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (invalidating con-
fession obtained after police investigation in which accused was not permitted
to consult lawyer and had not been informed of his rights).
183. Letter from Scott Davis to William 0. Douglas (Aug. 9, 1963) (on file
with William 0. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box
382).
184. See Governor George C. Wallace, Various Speeches (1964) (transcripts
available in Reel 1 of Papers of George C. Wallace, State Archives, Montgomery,
Alabama).
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typical remarks in Richmond in June, for example, Wallace
declared that
[w]ith the power in the United States Supreme Court to
construe the Constitution in a manner to negate limita-
tions upon the power of the federal government, we are
confronted with the cold hard fact that the people are not
sovereign over their government any longer and that we,
in fact, are bordering on an entirely different form of gov-
ernment. It is judicial oligarchy pure and simple. It has
been accomplished by revolution. 5
Discontent over reapportionment decisions found expres-
sion in the 1964 Republican platform, which called for "a
Constitutional amendment, as well as legislation, enabling
states having bicameral legislatures to apportion one House
on bases of their choosing, including factors other than popu-
lation."18 The platform also responded to the Court's school
prayer decision, proposing an amendment "permitting those
individuals and groups who choose to do so to exercise their
religion freely in public places," provided that the state did
not prepare or prescribe religious exercises, or coerce partici-
pation.8 7
In criticizing the Supreme Court in several dozen
speeches during the 1964 campaign, Goldwater probably
spoke more harshly about the Court than any previous major
party candidate. Attacks on the Court blended well with the
broader themes of his campaign. The Court's activism pro-
vided an example of the dangerous concentration of federal
power against which he crusaded. The reapportionment deci-
sions particularly provided fresh and potent illustrations of
the erosion of states' rights about which he complained so bit-
terly. He also linked the Court's decisions on criminal proce-
dure and school prayer to the moral decay about which he so
frequently warned.' As columnist Anthony Lewis observed
185. Governor George C. Wallace, Speech at the Alabama State Fair Grounds
(June 27, 1964) (transcript available in Reel 1 of Papers of George C. Wallace,
State Archives, Montgomery, Alabama).
186. 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 686.
187. See id. at 683. A Roman Catholic seminarian proposed early in 1964
that Goldwater's interjection of the prayer issue into the campaign could "pro-
duce a vast good will toward" the Senator since "support for the prayer amend-
ment knows no party or religious lines." Russell Kirk, Organizing Against the
Supreme Court, NATIONAL REVIEW, May 19, 1964, at 406.
188. Barry M. Goldwater, Speech Before the Committee On Commerce,
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with some exaggeration at mid-campaign, Goldwater "has
seemed to be running against the nine justices instead of
Lyndon B. Johnson."'189
Goldwater fired his first volley in Idaho on September 10,
savaging the reapportionment decisions. Although Goldwater
tacitly acknowledged that the Constitution provides that no
state shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate
without its consent, he predicted that the Court's decisions
would lead to apportionment of the Senate on the basis of
population.9 0 Alleging that reapportionment decisions would
"have a more dangerous effect than anything that's happened
throughout the course of our Republic," Goldwater warned
that
it's going to destroy the representative vote of the small
States, populationwise. It's going to destroy the suburban
vote ... the farmer, the miner, the forester's vote, and
place it all in the concentration of boss-controlled cities,
mostly in the East ... where we find crime on the
streets.'9 '
Speaking later in the day in another sparsely populated state,
Montana, Goldwater reiterated this warning and blasted the
Court for "sticking its judicial nose" into reapportionment
questions." 2
On the following day, Goldwater delivered a more meas-
ured but no less pungent attack on the Court in an address to
the American Political Science Association in Chicago. De-
crying the Court's departure from original intent in the reap-
portionment and school prayer decisions as an exercise of
"raw and naked power," he alleged that "of all three branches
of Government today's Supreme Court is the least faithful to
the constitutional tradition of limited government, and to the
principle of legitimacy in the exercise of power."'93 Although
Goldwater conceded "that law must keep up with the chang-
United States Senate, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., in The Speeches, Remarks, Press
Conferences, and Related Papers of Senator Barry M. Goldwater, July 16
Through November 4, 1964, in 3 CAMPAIGN '64, at 170 [hereinafter "Goldwater
Speeches"].
189. Anthony Lewis, Campaign: The Supreme Court Key Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1964, at 8E.
190. See Goldwater Speeches, supra note 188, at 170.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 176.
193. Id. at 191.
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ing times," he averred that "the job of keeping the law up to
date should be in the hands of the legislatures, the Congress
and the common law courts, not just in the hands of the nine
appointed Justices."'94 As in later speeches, he likened the
Court's alleged usurpation of power to the dictatorial tenden-
cies of the "power-wielding, arm-twisting" Johnson.9 Al-
though Goldwater conceded that many members of his audi-
ence might approve of the results of the Court's decisions, he
declared that "to a constitutionalist, it is at least as important
that the use of power be legitimate than that it be benefi-
cial." 96
Although Goldwater's attacks on the Court's decisions
were part of his broader criticism of excessive government
and abuse of power, Goldwater also criticized the Court's de-
cisions expanding the rights of criminal defendants. In one
speech, for example, Goldwater alleged that the criminal pro-
cedure decisions had "reduced the policeman's job to an al-
most impossible one" and had "actually made it safer for you
to be a criminal than to be a law-abiding citizen."'97 While
these criticisms may seem inconsistent with Goldwater's es-
sential libertarianism, they were consistent with his strong
belief in states' rights. As Goldwater explained in another
speech, "We don't want a Federal police in this country. We
don't need one.' 99
Like earlier presidential candidates who had criticized
the judiciary, Goldwater found that attacks on the courts
were not the most effective means of stirring an audience.
One campaign organizer reported to national headquarters
"with a sob in his voice" that Goldwater's discussion of consti-
tutional law bored and confused a Charlotte audience that
had expected "blood and guts" from Goldwater after Strom
Thurmond "got the crowd all fired up." The organizer re-
marked that "even the press remarked afterwards that an
opportunity had been missed."199
194. Id. at 192.
195. Id. at 190.
196. Goldwater Speeches, supra note 188, at 190.
197. Id. at 370.
198. Id. at 397.
199. Memorandum from Pat Ryder to Denison Kitchel, Dean Burch, John
Grenier, Wayne Hood, and Sam Caliborne (Sept. 23, 1964) (on file with Goldwa-
ter Papers, Arizona Historical Foundation, Hayden Library, Arizona State Uni-
versity, Tempe, Arizona, Box W-8).
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Since the courts so often have been sacrosanct in presi-
dential campaigns, Goldwater's remarks about the courts
played into the hands of his opponents, who were attempting
to portray him as a dangerous radical. Goldwater's willing-
ness to criticize the courts was characteristic of Goldwater's
almost reckless bluntness throughout the 1964 campaign. In
contrast with the circumspection of most presidential candi-
dates, who try to position themselves as moderates, Goldwa-
ter refused to compromise his conservative creed."'
Like LaFollette's attacks on the Court in 1924, Goldwa-
ter's criticisms of the Court provoked predictable expressions
of outrage. One of the most strident came from Emmanuel
Celler, the chair of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S.
House of Representatives, who castigated Goldwater for his
"violent demagoguery" and for using the "Court as a political
football."2 1  Like LaFollette's critics four decades earlier,
Celler warned that attacks on the judiciary could have revo-
lutionary consequences, leading to fascism or communism.0 2
Celler alleged that Goldwater's "emotional attack on the
Court can only incite disrespect for law and order. While he
claims to oppose lawlessness, his irresponsible action is actu-
ally inciting it."2 3
As Goldwater continued to criticize the Court, many
prominent attorneys echoed Celler's complaint in terms that
were reminiscent of the elite bar's attacks on LaFollette in
1924. On October 11, fifty lawyers, including members of
both parties, twelve present or former law school deans, and
five former ABA presidents, issued a statement deploring
Goldwater's "attack upon the ultimate guardian of American
liberty."20 4 Contending that Goldwater's criticisms "overpass
200. See RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE
UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS 429-30 (2001).
201. Press Release, Emmanuel Celler, Celler Defends Supreme Court Against
Goldwater Charges (Sept. 13, 1964) (on file with Emmanuel Celler Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 298).
202. See id. Celler argued that "one of the first - and surest - steps to totali-
tarianism is taking away the independence of the courts of a nation. That is
what Hitler and Mussolini did. And that is what Fascist dictators have done in
our own time." Id.
203. Id. Celler contended that judicial independence "is a cherished value
that true conservatives have historically sought to preserve, not destroy." Id.
Accordingly, Celler alleged that Goldwater's criticism of the Court provided
"striking proof that he is a radical, not a conservative, on public matters." Id.
204. Anthony Lewis, Goldwater Stand on Court Decried, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
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the limits of comment appropriate in presidential candidate,"
the statement alleged that Goldwater's "attacks are not based
on reasoned analysis of the Court's opinion's [sic]" but rather
upon "catch phrases and slogans.1
2 5
Some of Goldwater's critics suggested that Goldwater's
criticisms of the Court were intended to bolster his support
among segregationists who were embittered by the Court's
decisions on race. Although Goldwater scrupulously re-
frained from criticizing Brown or any other desegregation de-
cision, Southern audiences who applauded Goldwater's criti-
cism of the Court for interjecting itself into social and political
issues "left no doubt in reporters' minds that they believed
that Goldwater disapproved of the Supreme Court's school
desegregation decisions and its other rulings protecting the
civil rights of Negroes." °6
Johnson responded to Goldwater's criticisms of the Court
by loftily declaring that he did not regard the Court as an ap-
propriate election issue." ' Johnson's refusal to use Goldwa-
ter's criticisms of the Court to portray Goldwater as a danger-
ous radical, in contrast to Coolidge's dire warnings about
LaFollette in 1924, may suggest that Johnson feared that
Goldwater was striking a chord in his criticism of the Court.
It is more likely, however, that Johnson's silence was simply
consistent with his strategy of ignoring his opponent, leaving
surrogates to portray Goldwater as a dangerous radical.
Responding to attacks on Goldwater for his criticisms of
the courts, many conservatives rallied to Goldwater's defense,
pointing to the Court itself as the cause of the criticism. The
Wall Street Journal argued that the Court had made itself an
election issue by interjecting itself into so many political con-
troversies in a manner that many Americans believed ex-
1964, at 24.
205. Id.
206. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and Supreme
Court: The Goldwater Campaign, 32 PuB. OPIN. Q. 31, 33 (1968). Murphy and
Tanenhaus point out that Goldwater "took great pains to avoid any explicit at-
tack on decisions affecting the rights of Negroes, but he did say that he opposed
transporting students to schools outside their own neighborhoods merely to
achieve racial balance in classes." Id. Even though Goldwater avoided any spe-
cific criticisms of the federal courts' decisions on race, many of Goldwater's
staunchest supporters were segregationists and Goldwater had won much sup-
port by voting against the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
207. See id.
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ceeded its authority."' The Journal declared that "[tihe peo-
ple . . .pick the issues on which they measure candidates.
And any politician should know that he ignores the public
only at his own peril.""9 Similarly, a New Jersey man told
Celler that the Court had provoked Goldwater's criticism "by
its own actions. The Supreme Court interjects itself into poli-
tics!"
210
In addition to criticizing judicial decisions, Goldwater re-
peatedly reminded his audiences that the President had the
power to appoint federal judges. He emphasized that many
major decisions were based on five-to-four votes, thereby im-
plying that as few as one appointment might be enough to
transform the Court. In Evansville, Goldwater warned that
Johnson might appoint "more capricious people" to the federal
courts, 21 and in Knoxville he warned that "the makeup of the
Supreme Court" alone was reason to be "very, very worried
about who is the President in the next four or eight years."2 2
Goldwater averred that presidential appointments "must con-
sider the need to redress constitutional interpretation in favor
of the public."2 13  He promised to appoint judges "who will
support the Constitution, not scoff at it."2 14
208. Editorial, Boundaries of the Battlefield, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1964, at 8.
209. Id.
210. Letter from Earl Bamgaezi to Emanuel Celler (Sept. 14, 1964) (on file
with Emmanuel Celler Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box
298). In response to Celler's contention that Goldwater had engaged in dema-
goguery, the writer accused Celler of demagoguery in ignoring the political
opinions of the majority of people. See id.
211. See Goldwater Speeches, supra note 188, at 271.
212. Id. at 232. Goldwater asked his audience to
[jiust think... what would happen if appointments were made on a ju-
dicial basis: men who knew the law, respect the law, respect the Con-
stitution . . . . [Ihf those kinds of appointments can be made ...
[pirogress will be hurried up, because only ... under our Constitution
can freedom be protected and preserved and if it's slowly to be de-
stroyed by judgments not based upon it, if it's slowly to be destroyed by
the centralizing of vast powers in the executive branch of Government,
if it's slowly to be destroyed by taking away from the people the rights
that are theirs ... then we are not long for the exercise and enjoyment
of freedom in this country.
Id.
213. Id. at 500.
214. Id. at 665. Goldwater's criticisms of the Court were gleefully amplified
by many of his supporters. Speaking at a Goldwater rally on Halloween, an Ar-
kansas Supreme Court justice won laughter and applause by declaring that
"every U.S. Supreme Court decision day is a new Halloween." Goldwater
Speeches, supra note 188, at 957 (remarks of Jim Johnson). Predicting that the
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Like LaFollette and other presidential candidates who
have criticized the Court, Goldwater did not personally attack
the Chief Justice, even when his more ardent supporters en-
couraged him to do so. Addressing a conservative audience in
a small Arizona town early in his campaign for the nomina-
tion, Goldwater was asked to comment on the loyalty of Earl
Warren. "I think he's a very loyal man," Goldwater declared,
amid silence.215 Although Goldwater acknowledged that War-
ren's opinions were too leftist for his taste, he emphasized
that the Chief Justice was not "un-American."216
Although Goldwater's sharp criticisms of the Court
probably had little impact on the election, Goldwater's will-
ingness to speak harshly about this revered institution may
have contributed to the public perception of Goldwater as a
dangerous radical that helped Johnson win a landslide vic-
tory. Goldwater's defeat therefore could serve as another ob-ject lesson in the perils of criticizing the Court during a presi-
dential campaign. In contrast to LaFollette's defeat in 1924,
however, Goldwater's defeat did not chill future discussions of
the Court in presidential campaigns. Perhaps emboldened by
Goldwater's defeat, the Court during the next few years con-
tinued to render decisions that made it even more controver-
sial and invited criticism by candidates in the next presiden-
tial election.
0. The 1968 Election
Judicial issues may have influenced the outcome of the
1968 election more than any other election in the nation's his-
tory. Although the Vietnam War probably was the dominant
issue, the federal courts were at the heart of a maelstrom of
controversy that included a broad range of social issues that
affected the election, particularly crime and race. The Su-
preme Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,... ex-
panding the rights of criminal defendants, provoked espe-
next President would make at least four Supreme Court appointments during
the next four years, Governor James G. Byrnes of South Carolina, a former U.S
Supreme Court Justice, warned that if the new Justices "follow the present
Court in making law, instead of interpreting law, the Supreme Court will ab-
solutely destroy this Republic under which we have enjoyed such freedom." Id.
at 962.
215. Goldwater Takes Turn to Left, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1964, at 11.
216. Id.
217. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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cially intense criticism.218 Both Richard Nixon, the Republi-
can candidate, and George Wallace, the American Independ-
ent candidate who polled more votes than any third-party
candidate since LaFollette in 1924, frequently criticized the
Warren Court's activism and promised to nominate more con-
servative judges. Both Nixon and Wallace reiterated Goldwa-
ter's criticisms of the courts in 1964, with Nixon more oblique
than Goldwater and Wallace more blatant. As in other cam-
paigns, judicial issues were inextricably linked with other is-
sues. Professor Lasser has observed that "it would be a mis-
take to treat the law-and-order issue in 1968 as primarily a
Supreme Court issue" since political violence such as race ri-
ots and antiwar demonstrations may have worried voters
more than common crime.19 According to Lasser, "[tlhe Court
was brought into the picture only because of its high visibility
as a national symbol and because, for candidates like
Wallace, being against the Court on crime, like being against
the Court on racial issues, was good politics."22 °
Wallace showed clear distaste for the Court and Warren
in particular. Wallace alleged that Warren had "done more to
destroy constitutional government in this country than any
one man."'21 Like Southern Democrats in previous elections,
Wallace reminded voters that Earl Warren was a Republi-
can.22 In a New York City speech shortly before the election,
Wallace declared, "We don't have a sick society, we have a
sick Supreme Court," and he decried "perverted decisions"
that prohibited classroom prayer while permitting distribu-
tion of "obscene pornography." ' Wallace saved his most ve-
hement criticism for the Court's decision on criminal rights,
particularly Miranda.
Wallace's American Independent Party platform also
sharply criticized the Court. In particular it advocated that
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals judges face periodic re-
218. See LEWIS CHESTER ET AL., AN AMERICAN MELODRAMA: THE
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1968, at 230-31 (1969).
219. See LASSER, supra note 11, at 196.
220. Id.
221. Walter Rugaber, Wallace Woos Mississippi; Scores Warren Career, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1968, at 17:2.
222. See id.
223. DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 367 (1995).
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confirmation by the Senate, and that district judges be sub-jected to periodic retention elections that would result in the
appointment of a new judge if the electorate voted against re-
tention of the judge.224 The platform also castigated the Su-
preme Court for excessive activism,225 particularly in the area
of law enforcement.
Campaigning for the Republican nomination, Nixon de-
nounced Miranda and advocated legislation to allow a judge
and jury to decide whether a confession was voluntary. 27 As
Professor Ambrose has observed, Nixon during the primaries
"made law and order his central theme, and played it hard to
enthusiastic audiences who greeted his punch line with en-
thusiastic applause: 'Some of our courts have gone too far in
weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces.' 228
During the autumn campaign, Nixon promised to appointjudges who would "be strict constructionists who saw their
duty as interpreting and not making law. They would see
themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of
the people, not super-legislators with a free hand to impose
their social forces and political viewpoints on the American
people.229 Many liberals, however, predicted that Nixon's ju-
dicial appointments would be more liberal than his rhetoric
224. 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 702. The platform de-
clared that "[tihe members of the Federal judiciary, feeling secure in their
knowledge that their appointment is for life, have far exceeded their constitu-
tional authority, which is limited to interpreting or construing the law." Id.
225. See id. The platform alleged that "the Federal judiciary, primarily the
Supreme Court, transgress repeatedly upon the prerogatives of the Congress
and exceed its authority by enacting judicial legislation, in the forms of deci-
sions based upon political and sociological considerations, which never would
have been enacted by the Congress." Id.
226. See id. The platform charged that the courts, "in their solicitude for the
criminal and lawless element of our society," had "shackle[d] the police and
other law enforcement agencies" and thereby "have made it increasingly diffi-
cult to protect the law-abiding citizen from crime and criminals." Id. According
to the platform, "[tihis is one of the principal reasons for the turmoil and near
revolutionary conditions which prevail in our country today." Id. Echoing the
platform, Wallace alleged in a speech in September that the Court had "taken
over our lives" and he vowed to put "it in its place" by carrying out his platform
to require periodic reconfirmation of Justices. See REVIEW OF THE NEWS, Oct. 2,
1968, at 1.
227. See 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN
1962-1972, at 154 (1989).
228. Id.
229. See STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 181. Nixon pointedly also promised
to appoint judges who were mindful of the rights of crime victims. See id.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
suggested because Nixon was more liberal than his reputa-
tion.23 °
Democratic nominee Hubert H. Humphrey defended the
Court, expressing his belief that the "Court in these very
critical years has served the national interest extraordinarily
well."23' In particular, Humphrey contended that the Court's
decisions had "not impaired law enforcement; they have
merely placed upon the police and the attorneys, county at-
torneys, district attorneys and others ... a greater under-
standing of statutory and constitutional law."2 32 Humphrey
also warned that no President could "manage" the Supreme
Court.233
Earl Warren's announcement of his resignation as Chief
Justice in June enhanced the Court's importance as an elec-
tion issue because there was uncertainty at first about
whether the Senate would confirm Johnson's nomination of
Abe Fortas to succeed Warren, or whether the next President
would nominate the Chief Justice.234 When the nomination
died in the Senate in September, the stakes of the election in-
creased with the certainty that the new President would se-
lect the next Chief Justice. Since Hugo Black was eighty-
three years old, the next President also seemed likely to make
at least one other appointment.
P. The 1972 Election
The intensity of public discontent with the Court began
to wane along with the diminution of activism by the Court
after the retirement of Warren in 1969. In 1972, the Nixon
campaign boasted that Nixon's appointments of Warren E.
Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William H.
Rehnquist had fulfilled Nixon's 1968 campaign promise to
appoint conservatives to the Court. Pointing to decreases in
the crime rate, the G.O.P. platform cited the appointment of
"judges whose respect for the rights of the accused is balanced
230. See James Reston, Washington: The Next Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1968, at 12E.
231. Excerpts From the Debate Among Three Candidates Before California
Delegation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1968, at 34.
232. Id.
233. See Max Frankel, Humphrey Scores 'The Same Nixon,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 1968, at 1.
234. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 305-544 (1988).
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by an appreciation of the legitimate needs of law enforce-
ment" as one of many ways in which the Nixon Administra-
tion had helped to win "the war on crime."215 Meanwhile, the
American Party, the remnant of Wallace's movement, which
received only one percent of the vote in 1972, called for the
election of federal district judges and the quadrennial recon-
firmation of federal appellate judges.236 Although the 1972
election was held only two months before the Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade,8 7 abortion played no part in the campaign -
perhaps the classic example of the difficulty of predicting
what judicial issues will figure prominently in the future.
Q. The 1976 Election
Growing recognition of the Supreme Court appointment
process238 manifested itself in the appearance of judicial issues
in the 1976 election. Although judicial issues were not
prominent in this campaign, their emergence during a time
when the Court was not the subject of any intense contro-
versy marked the beginning of the permanent presence of ju-
dicial issues in presidential campaigns.
In an apparent effort to appeal to conservatives, Demo-
cratic nominee Jimmy Carter remarked in September that
the Warren Court had gone "too far" in protecting the legal
rights of criminal defendants, although he did not mention
any decisions by name, and he praised the Burger Court for
restoring what he described as more balance.2"9 Carter's more
liberal running mate, Walter Mondale, expressed public dis-
agreement with Carter, defending the Warren Court's devo-
tion to individual liberties.24 ° During the third presidential
debate, both candidates praised the Court in different ways
for its recent modification of Miranda.241' Asked about pro-
235. JOHNSON, supra note 111, at 868-69. The platform also pointed to the
Supreme Court appointments of "distinguished lawyers of firm judicial tem-
perament and fidelity to the Constitution." Id. at 869.
236. See id. at 770.
237. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
238. This was reflected in the unprecedented detail with which senators
questioned John Paul Stevens during his 1975 confirmation hearings. Nomina-
tion of John Paul Stevens to be Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 27, 31, 45, 46, 56-57, 77 (1975).
239. See Linda Charlton, Mondale Recalls Role in Cases on Defendant Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1976, at 32.
240. See id.
241. See Transcript of Final Debate Between 2 Presidential Candidates, N.Y.
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spective Supreme Court appointments, Carter promised to in-
stitute a merit-based selection procedure similar to one that
he implemented as governor of Georgia, while Ford expressed
pride in his appointment of Stevens and described him as the
model for any future appointments.242
R. The 1980 Election
The 1980 election campaign was the first in which the
impact of judicial appointments on the right to abortion was a
prominent issue. The Republican platform, which endorsed a
constitutional amendment to limit abortion, seemed to make
abortion a litmus test for judicial selection insofar as it called
for the "appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary
who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of in-
nocent life."243 In its discussion of abortion, the platform also
declared, "We protest the Supreme Court's intrusion into the
family structure through its denial of the parents' obligation
and right to guide their minor children.2 4  This language
provoked widespread criticism,242 and the ABA voted over-
whelmingly at its annual convention to oppose judicial selec-
tion "on the basis of particular political or ideological philoso-
phies."21 6 An organization called Americans Concerned for the
Judiciary placed advertisements that depicted nine Justices
with Reagan's face and warned that "this GOP litmus test
would destroy the independent federal judiciary as we know
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1976, at 10. Carter praised the Burger Court for reaffirming
various liberal Warren Court decisions on reapportionment and criminal justice.
Ford stated that Miranda
made it very, very difficult for the police ... to do what they could to
make certain that the victim of a crime was protected and that those
that commit crimes were properly handled and sent to jail. The
Miranda case, the Burger Court is gradually changing, and I'm pleased
to see ... some steps being made by the Burger Court to modify the so-
called Miranda decision.
Id.
242. See id.
243. DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS OF 1980:
SUPPLEMENT TO NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1976, at 203 (1982). As
Professor Stephenson has remarked, "[t]he meaning of that ... pledge was un-
mistakable: one's stand on Roe v. Wade was to be litmus test for appointments
to the federal courts." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 202.
244. JOHNSON, supra note 243, at 183.
245. See, e.g., Editorial, The Reagan Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1980, at A26.
246. Linda Greenhouse, Bar Panel Opposes G.O.P.'s Plank for Judges Who
Support Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1980, at A20.
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it.
47
In response to such intense criticism of the platform's
language, Reagan announced early in October that he would
not select judges on the basis of their opinions on any single
issue.2 48  Reagan's critics carefully scrutinized his appoint-
ments to the California courts during his eight years as gov-
ernor as part of a broad effort to determine whether Reagan
would fill the courts with ideologues. However, even many of
Reagan's opponents concluded that Reagan had based his ap-
pointments largely on merit rather than on ideology or cro-
nyism, even though Reagan's appointees tended to be very
249
conservative.
Reagan later promised to select a woman to fill "among
the first Supreme Court vacancies in my administration."5 °
Reagan's pledge was widely regarded as an effort to increase
his support among women, many of whom were antagonized
by his opposition to the proposed equal rights amendment
and his bellicose rhetoric on foreign policy issues.25' In re-
sponse, Carter and other Democrats accused Reagan of pan-
dering to women voters and pointed to Carter's own record of
appointing women to lower federal judgeships in record num-
bers.
Moreover, Carter emphasized his judicial appointments
record in an effort to shore up his support among liberals.252
Although Carter boasted of the unprecedented number of
women and racial minorities that he appointed, and pointed
out that he named more lawyers rated as "well qualified" by
the ABA than either Nixon or Ford, his critics alleged that
Carter had failed to fulfill his 1976 pledge to appoint judges
247. Reagan and the Courts: The Class of '81?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1980, at
8E.
248. See Wallace Turner, Reagan Says He Would Not Use Single-Issue Test to
Pick Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1980, at 1.
249. See id. See also Editorial, The Reagan Court, Cont., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
1980, at A34.
250. Douglas E. Kneeland, Reagan Pledges Woman on Court; Carter Chal-
lenges Foe on Economy: The Republican Defends Stance on Equal Rights and
War Accusations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1980, at 1.
251. See id.
252. See id. Although Carter said that he would be "honored" to nominate a
woman to the Court, he maintained that he would base his court appointments
strictly on merit. See id.
253. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Carter Judge Selections Praised, But Critics Dis-
cern Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1980, at Al.
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strictly on the basis of merit, yielding too often to partisan-
ship and patronage.254 On the eve of the election, a group of
prominent attorneys issued a statement alleging that Carter's
appointments were unduly partisan and expressing confi-
dence that Reagan would "nominate judges of the highest
caliber."
211
The importance of judicial issues in the campaign may
have been particularly prominent because five Justices were
over the age of seventy, and the Court was closely divided be-
tween liberals and conservatives. 256
S. The 1984 Election
In 1984, the Court emerged as more of an election issue
than at any time since 1968. Although Republicans said little
about the Court, Democratic nominee Walter Mondale em-
phasized the importance of judicial appointments throughout
his campaign. While the Court itself was not the focus of any
particular controversy, the advanced age of many Justices -
five were between the ages of seventy-six and seventy-eight -
strongly suggested that vacancies would occur during the
next four years.257
With the Court tenuously balanced between liberals and
conservatives the next President had the potential to deci-
sively shift the Court in one direction or another. Since the
older members of the Court tended to be more liberal than the
younger ones, liberals seemed more worried than conserva-
tives about the election's impact on the Court. Many liberals
feared that a "Reagan Court" would re-consider decades of de-
cisions that had expanded personal liberties,2 ' particularly
254. See id.
255. Ronald Reagan Will Take Partisan Politics out of Judicial Selection:
Statement by Leading Members of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, at A20
(paid advertisement).
256. See Taylor, supra note 253, at A20.
257. During the 1984 campaign, Chief Justice Burger was seventy-seven
years old; Brennan was seventy-eight; Powell was seventy-seven; Marshall was
seventy-six; and Blackmun was seventy-six. Of these, only Burger and Powell
retired during Reagan's second term.
258. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Whoever Is Elected, Potential Is Great for Change
in High Court's Course, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1984, at 30. As Democratic Sena-
tor Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts wrote a week before the election,
Everyone is aware of how the aging process is overtaking some of the
more progressive and more centrist of the Brethren. In the next four
years three, four, perhaps five vacancies will almost certainly occur on
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since constitutionally-charged issues such as abortion, school
prayer, and criminal prosecutions were personally so impor-
tant to Reagan.5 9
Commentators of all political stripes, however, tended to
agree that there was a stark contrast between the types of
Court appointments that the two candidates were likely to
make, and that the Court therefore should be a major cam-
260paign issue. Indeed, Reagan and Mondale seemed to have
fundamental differences in their conceptions of the role of
law, with Reagan viewing it as a means of maintaining eco-
nomic rights and defending "traditional values" and Mondale
seeing it as an agent for social change.261
In his campaign, Mondale focused on the effect that
Reagan would have on the Court. His warnings that Reagan
appointees could turn the Court farther to the right were con-
sistent with his focus on appealing to highly committed
Democrats who might worry about the impact of the Court on
such issues as religious liberty and the rights of women and
racial minorities. Mondale charged that "the Reagan concept
of justice is technically narrow, ideologically twisted and
spiritually empty," in contrast to the vision of "the Earl War-
rens" of the Court who had "helped move our nation to the
highest levels of political and personal freedom and de-
cency.
262
Democrats repeatedly warned that Reagan would appoint
right-wing Justices who would debase personal freedom. In
support of this argument, they often reminded voters of a
the nine-member court. Reagan, free in a second term from re-election
considerations, will follow his basic instincts and his ideology. And
when he applies these to Supreme Court appointments, we will witness
a profound shift in that institution.
Paul Tsongas, Editorial, Shaping the Future for Our Children, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1984, 1984 WL 2588349.
259. See David S. Broder, High Court Hangs in Balance, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 19, 1984.
260. See James J. Kilpatrick, Appointing Federal Judges, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1984, 1984 WL 2587741. See also Broder, supra note 259. Broder re-
marked that he could not "think of any area of public policy where the inten-
tions of Reagan and... Mondale are clearer or where their differences are more
stark or striking." Id.
261. See Broder, supra note 259. Running as an unabashed liberal, Mondale
vowed to raise taxes and to increase federal spending to help the poor and other
disadvantaged groups.
262. Don Davis, Mondale Grabs Rays for Upbeat Speech, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 28, 1984.
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February 1984 comment by conservative activist Jerry Fal-
well that "in Ronald Reagan's next five years in office we will
get at least two more appointments to the Supreme Court.,
263
Democrats seized on this as evidence that Reagan would
permit Falwell personally to pick two Justices,264 an allegation
that Falwell repeatedly denied.265 Mondale warned, "If you
pull their lever, you'll be handing over the Supreme Court to
Jerry Falwell, who wants to run the most private questions of
your life."266
Democratic warnings that Reagan would radicalize the
Court during his second term may have lost much of their
power to alarm, however, since Reagan's only Court appoint-
ment during his first term had been the moderate Sandra
Day O'Connor. Moreover, Reagan's appointment of the first
woman Justice may have diminished the impact of Mondale's
suggestion that the Court would turn back the clock on
women's rights.
The Republican platform applauded "Reagan's fine record
of judicial appointments" and reaffirmed "support for the ap-
pointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who support
traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human
life." The platform castigated the "elitist and unresponsive
Federal judiciary" and promised that Reagan would continue
to appoint federal judges "who share our commitment to judi-
cial restraint."
267
As in past and future elections, various commentators
263. Kathy Sawyer & Maralee Schwartz, Selectivity, Revisions Cloud Facts,
WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1984, 1984 WL 2011513.
264. See id.
265. See Abortions Will Be Banned, Falwell Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 11, 1984, 1984 WL 2305999. For example, Geraldine Ferraro stated during
her debate with Bush that she heard that "Falwell has been told that he will
pick two of our Supreme Court justices." Sawyer & Schwartz, supra note 263.
266. Mondale's Whipping Boy, TIME, Oct. 22, 1984, 1984 WL 2059880. One
of Mondale's television commercials alleged that Reagan and Falwell would re-
quire that "[a]ll new Supreme Court Justices must rule abortion is a crime even
in the case of rape and incest," even though Falwell may have favored abortion
for rape or incest. Id. As Mondale declared in a California speech shortly be-
fore the election in which the Court was his main topic, Reagan's supporters
"would seize our temple of liberty and turn it over to judges who pass the ap-
proval of the Jerry Falwells of our time. If Mr. Reagan gets four more years, the
far right will get five more justices." Davis, supra note 262. Looking lip from
his prepared remarks, Mondale admonished, "Don't let 'em have it. Don't let 'em
have it." Id.
267. Taylor, supra note 258.
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pointed out that judicial performance is difficult to predict.
Dismissing Mondale's warnings about Reagan appointments
as "sheer demagoguery," one newspaper pointed out that
"[a]lthough the White House can influence the long-range
course of the high court through a philosophic selection of
nominees, precise and immediate results are unpredict-
able. 268
Justice Rehnquist made the same point in a speech at the
University of Minnesota Law School two weeks before the
election. "History teaches us," Rehnquist declared, "that even
a 'strong' President determined to leave his mark on the
Court - a President such as Lincoln or Franklin Roosevelt - is
apt to be only partially successful. Neither the President nor
his appointees can foresee what issues will come before the
Court during the tenure of the appointees."269 Rehnquist ex-
plained that the Court is "far more dominated by centrifugal
forces, pushing towards individuality and independence, than
it is by centripetal forces pulling for hierarchical ordering and
institutional unity."27° Public scrutiny and professional criti-
cism encourage individuality rather than team loyalty,
Rehnquist contended. Moreover, he pointed out lifetime ten-
ure encourages independence and he made the less obvious
argument that the appointment of Justices "one at a time"
eliminates the danger that a Justice (unlike members of Con-
gress) will enter office with cohorts who will form a bloc and
create pressure for conformity.27'
Even though Rehnquist did not comment directly on the
election campaign, the political relevance of his arguments
was patent, and the spectacle of a Justice commenting on a
politically-charged issue on the eve of an election was, in the
words of one legal journalist, "particularly striking. '272 De-
nouncing this "blatant intrusion into partisan politics," legal
scholar Herman Schwartz warned that "[tihis injudicious ac-
tivism may well presage the Court we will get if Ronald
Reagan appoints a few more Justices like Justice
268. Editorial, Shaping the Court, SAN DIEGO UNION-TIRB., Nov. 3, 1984.
269. Rehnquist on Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1984, at 9.
270. Id.
271. See id.
272. Linda Greenhouse, Candid Look at High Court Finds That Presidents
Can't Pack Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1984, at 1.
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Rehnquist.' '273  Meanwhile, a New York Times editorial sug-
gested that Rehnquist's delivery of "such a speech in the
midst of a presidential campaign" discredited Rehnquist's ar-
gument that Justices stand above partisan politics.274
Rehnquist was not the only Justice who made comments
during the campaign that seemed to have the 1984 election in
mind. Speaking at the Cosmos Club in Washington in Sep-
tember, Blackmun described the Court as "moving to the
right where it wants to go by hook or by crook.""27 A month
earlier, Stevens had publicly chastised his conservative col-
leagues for "enthusiastic attempts to codify the law instead of
merely performing the judicial task of deciding the cases that
come before them" in recent decisions limiting affirmative ac-
tion and the rights of criminal defendants.276 The comments
of Blackmun and Stevens may have encouraged Mondale to
make the Court more of an election issue.
As in other elections, however, there is little evidence
that judicial issues actually swayed many votes in 1984.277
The increased focus on Supreme Court appointments pres-
aged the upcoming controversy over Robert Bork's nomina-
tion to the Court.
T. The 1988 Election
The controversy over Reagan's nomination of Rehnquist
to the Chief Justiceship in 1986 and the firestorm over the
nomination of Bork in 1987 called such sharp attention to the
importance of Supreme Court appointments that one would
have expected the Court to emerge as a significant issue in
273. Herman Schwartz, Rehnquist's Partisan Intrusion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1984, at 35. Schwartz also argued that "despite a few well-publicized excep-
tions, Presidents rarely have been disappointed with the voting records of the
people they appoint." Id.
274. See Editorial, Justice Rehnquist's Assurances, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1984,
at A32.
275. High Court Seen Moving to Right, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1984, at B3.
276. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Stevens Is Sharply Critical of Supreme
Court Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1984, at 1.
277. Professor Stephenson has written that
[iun contrast to the election of 1968, the Supreme Court and social is-
sues, as conspicuous in the campaign as they were, did not measurably
affect the outcome of the election of 1984. Reagan's popularity was suf-
ficiently great as to have defeated Mondale had social issues such as
abortion not energized some of Reagan's ardent supporters. Many vot-
ers picked Reagan in spite of, not because of, his stand on abortion.
STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 209.
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the 1988 election,"' especially since the Court's membership
remained highly geriatric. Yet judicial issues were not
prominent in the 1988 campaign. The relative obscurity of
judicial issues in the campaign in the wake of the Bork con-
troversy puzzled many observers. 9  Other commentators
pointed out that the bitterly fought Bork nomination may
have discouraged discussion of judicial issues because it dem-
onstrated that the Court could be a political tinderbox.28 ° As
Bork himself remarked, the presidential candidates "may not
know which way it will cut."'' Dukakis particularly had rea-
son to avoid the issue since it could have involved him in dis-
cussion of issues such as abortion, civil rights, and criminal
justice that he needed to avoid if he was to shake off Bush's
efforts to tag him as a dangerous liberal.282 Some observers
concluded that court issues were not prominent in the cam-
paign because both candidates were so moderate that that
they would appoint similar types of judges."' Other observers
argued just the opposite-that there was no issue on which
the candidates differed more widely.284
Although the Court was dividing five-to-four in favor of
conservatives in many cases, Bush appeared to have more
opportunity than Dukakis to influence the Supreme Court's
direction because the three oldest Justices, Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, all who were more than eighty by the
end of Reagan's term, were the Court's most liberal members.
278. In particular, the televising of Bork's confirmation hearings made many
Americans much more cognizant of judicial issues.
279. See Bob Dart, Bush Likely Would Influence Court More Than Dukakis,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 19, 1988, 1988 WL 6004294. Schwartz contended that
"Bush has moved far to the right on social issues. He has promised these people
the sun, the moon, and the stars." Id.
280. See Rita Ciolli, Unaddressed Issue: High Court's Future, NEWSDAY, Oct.
17, 1988, 1988 WL 2984072. Senator Hatch, for example, explained that "both
sides are a little afraid. Bush saw what happened to Bob Bork, and Dukakis
knows he would be vulnerable, too." Id. Similarly, James McClellan, the Presi-
dent of the conservative Center for Judicial Studies, described the judicial issue
as "the burning ember underneath the political fire that neither side wants to
stoke." Id.
281. John Omicinski, GNS Spotlight, Sept. 28, 1988.
282. See Ciolli, supra note 280 (quoting Arthur Krop, President of People for
the American Way).
283. See Omicinski, supra note 281 (quoting George Washington University
Law Prof. John Morgan).
284. See Adam Pertman, Election Key to High Court Balance, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 18, 1998, 1988 WL 4632696.
446 [Vol. 42
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
Unless departures occurred among the Court's younger mem-
bers, Democrats therefore could only realistically hope for the
Court to retain its balance, while Republicans could hope to
move the Court decisively in a conservative direction.285 In a
speech to federal court of appeals judges in July 1988, Black-
mun predicted that judicial issues would make the election "a
very significant one" and that "the court could be become very
conservative into the 21" century" if Bush won.286 Similarly,
Bush was expected to have more opportunity than Dukakis to
influence the lower federal courts because many of the Carter
appointees were expected to retire.2 7
Judicial experts were divided on the extent to which
Bush would try to replace liberal Justices with conservatives.
One legal scholar, Herman Schwartz, warned that Bush
would placate the right wing of his party by giving them
"more Bob Borks. '288 Other scholars, however, predicted that
Bush's judicial appointments would reflect what they re-
garded as his essential moderation. 89 Moreover, some ob-
servers pointed out that the likelihood that Bush would face a
Democratic Senate would diminish the chances that Bush
would appoint ultra-conservatives to the Court.299
Dukakis emphasized judicial issues primarily in his ap-
peals to women and African-Americans. He warned that
Bush might appoint Justices who would overturn Roe,29' a
prediction that was not unwarranted since the Republican
platform called for "the appointment of justices at all levels of
the judiciary who respect traditional values and the sanctity
of innocent human life." Both candidates promised that they
would not use an abortion litmus test in appointing judges.292
Bush made this pledge notwithstanding the Republican plat-
form's advocacy of the appointment of pro-life judges. As-
suring a predominately black audience near the end of the
campaign that judicial appointments would be a key part of
285. See id.
286. Ciolli, supra note 280.
287. See id.
288. Dart, supra note 279.
289. See id. (quoting A.E. Dick Howard and Burt Neuborne).
290. See Dart, supra note 279; Hatch Flays Dukakis Judicial Record,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18, 1988, 1988 WL 2694133.
291. See Kevin Sack, Both Candidates Focus on Luring Swing Democrats,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 1, 1988, 1988 WL 6006509.
292. See Dart, supra note 279.
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his effort to revitalize civil rights activism, Dukakis promised
to "choose people like Thurgood Marshall ... not Robert Bork,
for our nation's courts."293 Dukakis also criticized Reagan for
appointing too few women and minorities to the federal bench
and pointed with pride to his record of appointing significant
numbers of women and minorities to the Massachusetts
courts .294
Meanwhile, Republicans warned that Dukakis would ap-
point leftist judges. A week before the election, Bush prom-
ised to "appoint moderate persons of conservative views" and
alleged that Dukakis "would appoint doctrinaire liberals."295
In a number of speeches, Bush charged that Dukakis nomi-
nees would be unduly lenient with criminals. Similarly,
Reagan publicly alleged that Dukakis would nominate liberal
activists who were soft on crime.296
Dukakis's judicial appointments as Governor of Massa-
chusetts provided insights into the type of persons he might
appoint to the federal bench. In contrast with Bush, who had
never made a judicial appointment, Dukakis as Governor had
appointed 127 Massachusetts judges, including two members
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.297 During
the brief discussion of judicial issues in the second of the
three debates, Dukakis explained that he had appointed
judges on the basis of "independence and integrity and intel-
ligence" rather than ideological criteria, a point he reiterated
later in the campaign.298 Some of Dukakis's opponents alleged
that he had appointed liberal activists,299 while studies of Du-
kakis's judicial appointments characterized them as highly
293. Dennis Bell, Rivals Differ on Rights Remedies, NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1988,
at 21, 1988 WL 2985882..
294. See Pertman, supra note 284. Five percent of Reagan's judicial nomi-
nees were members of racial minority groups, compared with eleven percent of
Dukakis's. See id. Nine percent of Reagan's nominees were women, compared
with eighteen percent of Dukakis's. See id.
295. Jerome R. Watson, Bush vows early summit, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Nov. 2,
1988, 1988 WL 4690973.
296. See Duke Rips Bush's 'Lies,' CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 22, 1988, 1988 WL
4689125.
297. See Ciolli, supra note 280; Dart, supra note 279.
298. See Ciolli, supra note 280.
299. Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah claimed that the judges, Paul Liacos and
Ruth Abrams, had pursued the "ACLU social agenda." See Hatch Flays Du-
kakis Judicial Record, supra note 290.
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competent and generally moderate to liberal. °00 Dukakis drew
widespread praise for instituting a judicial merit selection
process early in his first term, which he had followed during
all three of his terms,"' and for the time and attention that he
had devoted to reviewing judicial candidates.0 2 Dukakis was
expected to restore Carter's practice of receiving non-binding
recommendations from a nominating commission, a practice
that Reagan had abandoned.3 3
Bush's repeated attacks on Dukakis for his membership
in the ACLU naturally made civil rights activists leery about
the sort of judges that Bush would nominate.0 4 In a speech
late in September, Bush asked whether Dukakis would con-
sult the ACLU in making judicial appointments.0 5 Bush's
persistent advocacy of flag salutes in schools and his frequent
attacks on Dukakis for vetoing a statute requiring teachers to
lead such salutes helped to confirm liberal suspicions that
Bush's judicial nominees would be hostile toward civil liber-
ties,' °6 although this fear overlooked the often gaping dispar-
ity between campaign rhetoric and presidential performance.
In an observation that could be applied to most presiden-
tial campaigns, one commentator stated that "[nieither can-
didate has discussed in detail his vision of the court; the legal
philosophy and the qualifications he would expect of a nomi-
nee, or the selection process he would use in choosing one.
Instead, each has used references to the court to bolster cam-
paign themes."3 7 The candidates discussed judicial issues
only in the second of the three debates, in which Bush prom-
ised to try to spare the nation from a liberal majority "that is
300. See William J. Choyke, Dukakis' Appointments to Judiciary Win Praise,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 1988, at 1A, 1988 WL 5327773.
301. See id. Dukakis appointed a Judicial Nominating Council, which inves-
tigated applicants for judgeships and recommended three to the governor for
each post. The governor's choice, in turn, was confirmed by an elected nine-
member Executive Council. See id.
302. See Jonathan Groner, Dukakis and Judges: Micro-management, AM.
LAW., Sept. 1988, at 109-13.
303. See id. at 113.
304. See Bell, supra note 293, at 21.
305. See Bush Hints ACLU Might Pack Dukakis High Court, COURIER-J.,
Sept. 30, 1988, 1988 WL 3302380.
306. See Nat Hentoff, What Kind of Justices Would They Name?, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 1988, at A23, 1988 WL 2029480.
307. Ciolli, supra note 280.
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going to legislate from the bench.""' When Bush defended
Reagan's judicial nominees, including Bork, as "outstanding,"
Dukakis retorted that if Bush "thinks that Robert Bork was
an outstanding appointment, that is a very good reason for
voting" Democratic.09 Some liberals expressed regret that
Dukakis failed to make more of an issue out of the judiciary
during the campaign, 1' and various conservatives expressed
the same disappointment about Bush."'
U. The 1992 Election
Judicial issues in the 1992 campaign were aptly de-
scribed as "the dog that didn't bark.3 11 2 Yet Clarence Tho-
mas's controversial Supreme Court nomination had trans-
fixed and polarized the nation for several days only a year
earlier."3 One might have expected judicial issues to attain a
new salience in the 1992 campaign. In particular, the Court's
close division on key issues, notably abortion, should have
made judicial issues prominent. The importance of judicial
issues, however, remained what one commentator called "the
best kept secret" of the campaign.3"4 As in so many other
campaigns, political observers expressed dismay that voters
seemed to lack awareness of the election's importance in
shaping the federal judiciary.15 But an exit poll conducted by
major television networks indicated that more than one-third
of voters said that judicial issues were very important to them
in selecting a candidate.1 6 This suggests that it was the can-
didates, rather than the voters, who tended to neglect judicial
issues in 1992. Paradoxically, the massive attention that the
308. Id.
309. See id.
310. See Jacqueline Trescott, The Voting Struggle: Marking 20 Years of Bal-
lot Rights Battles, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1988, at C02, 1988 WL 2027377
(quoting Joseph Rauh, Jr.).
311. See Pertman, supra note 284.
312. Silence on the Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1992, at 20,
1992 WL 9870885.
313. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 37, at 309-13.
314. See Timothy M. Phelps, Next President Could Alter Balance of Supreme
Court, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 1, 1992, at 22, 1992 WL 11455029.
315. See, e.g., Marianne Means, Voters Will Decide Supreme Court's Direc-
tion, S.F. EXAM'R, Oct. 16, 1992, at A23, 1992 WL 7588951; Editorial, The For-
gotten Issue: The Ideological Soul of the Supreme Court Is at Stake, DES MOINES
REG., Oct. 19, 1992.
316. See Jill Lawrence, Exit Polls Found Jobs, the Economy Top Concerns,
THE COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 4, 1992, 1992 WL 7864892.
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Court attracted during the Thomas nomination may have
made all three of the major candidates shy about discussing
the Court since the nation remained deeply divided over
Thomas. 1 ' Bush particularly had reason for reticence about
the Court since Anita Hill's charges against Thomas had both
embarrassed the Bush Administration and had made many
318
women voters hostile toward Bush's nomination of Thomas,
while many conservatives were disappointed over Bush's
nomination of the increasingly liberal David Souter. Clinton
may have avoided the issue after he apparently offended even
many pro-choice voters early in the campaign by promising to
appoint only Justices who would uphold Roe v. Wade."9
Moreover, as in all elections, discussion of the judiciary
could require the candidates to address controversial issues
that they would rather avoid. As Nan Aron, Executive Direc-
tor of the Alliance for Justice, a liberal coalition of public in-
terest lawyers, explained, "[t]here is a fear that once a candi-
date begins to talk about the court and the makeup of the
federal bench, that candidate will be forced into taking posi-
tions on issues, particularly social issues such as prayer in
school [or] desegregation."32 Clinton especially wanted to
avoid these issues in order to escape the stigmatic "liberal"
tag that Bush had so effectively pinned on Dukakis. Discus-
sion of judicial issues might have snared both major candi-
317. As one editorial observed, "the Supreme Court poses dangers for both
candidates, and they may feel that silence is the best policy." Silence on the
Court, supra note 312. Similarly, another commentator remarked that
"[n]either President Bush nor Gov. Bill Clinton reminds voters that major con-
stitutional rights depend on the outcome of this election. They have their rea-
sons, but it is a curious omission." Means, supra note 315.
318. As one Democrat explained, "[t]he court is bad news for George Bush.
He cannot get up and defend his record when a majority of people now say they
believe Anita Hill over Justice Thomas. That nomination engenders ridicule in
some quarters of the public." Phelps, supra note 314.
319. As one editorial explained, "[e]ven many pro-choice voters are uncom-
fortable with such an overt declaration of a 'litmus test' for Supreme Court
nominees. Clinton's pledge invites accusations of hypocrisy, since for 12 years
Democrats have decried purported conservative litmus tests for judicial ap-
pointments." Silence on the Court, supra note 312. See also Phelps, supra note
314. Despite the criticism, Clinton continued to defend the litmus test through-
out the campaign, pointing out that the GOP platform also advocated an abor-
tion litmus test. See '92 Presidential - Clinton: Talks on Litmus Test; Details
Restrictions in NJ, 4 ABORTION REP. (Am. Pol. Network), Oct. 30, 1992, at 18,
WESTLAW, Citation 10/30/92 APN-AB 18 (providing partial transcript of Prime
Time Live, ABC television broadcast, Oct. 29, 1992).
320. Phelps, supra note 314.
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dates into a discussion of abortion, a topic that both had par-
ticular reason to avoid in order to appeal to voters beyond
their core constituencies.321
The Court also might have receded into the background
because economic issues dominated the campaign. 22 Voters
in 1992 seemed more concerned about their jobs and their in-
vestments than about law-related issues such as crime or
constitutional liberties. No one could deny, however, that the
next President was likely to make appointments to the Court.
Although the resignations of Brennan and Marshall during
Bush's first term reduced the average age of the Justices from
its unusually high 1988 level, the eighty-three year old
Blackmun seemed likely to resign during the next four years
and there also was widespread speculation concerning fairly
imminent departures by seventy-five year old White, seventy-
two year old Stevens, or sixty-eight year old Rehnquist.3 ' In-
asmuch as the oldest member of the Court was probably its
most liberal, the re-election of Bush appeared more likely to
affect the Court than Clinton's election since the replacement
of Blackmun by a Bush appointee would be likely to make the
Court more conservative and could create an anti-abortion
majority. Expressing the fear of many liberals, columnist
William Raspberry declared that the Court "is bent so far to
the right already that leaving it to Bush to name one or two
more justices would constitute a judicial and political disaster
far into the next century."24 The Chicago Tribune spoke for
many conservatives in warning that Clinton was likely to
nominate
justices who are eager to pick up where the activist courts
of the 1960s and 1970s left off and to restore the liberal
decisions that the Rehnquist Court has either narrowed or
reversed. Racial quotas would be subject to less scrutiny;
321. As one commentator explained, both candidates' "supporters and detrac-
tors are locked in on that issue [abortion]. Both men need to expand their base
to voters for whom that issue is not paramount." Means, supra note 315.
322. See Phelps, supra note 314 (discussing Bush advisor James W. Cicconi's
view that economic issues were the focus of the campaign).
323. See, e.g., Editorial, Voting for Justices, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 7,
1992, at 10A, 1992 WL 10990875; Joan Biskupic, New Term Poses Test for Alli-
ance at Center of Conservative Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1992, at A12, 1992
WL 2163684.
324. William Raspberry, Remember Judicial Appointments, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 1992, at A27, 1992 WL 2159135.
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police and prosecutors would face new obstacles in ob-
taining convictions; appeals for the expansion of estab-
lished constitutional rights would get a sympathetic
321hearing.
Judicial issues arose most prominently in connection with
abortion, with Democrats warning that the appointment of
new Supreme Court Justices by Republicans could result in
the rejection of Roe v. Wade.3 21 In Democratic vice presiden-
tial nominee Albert Gore's debate with vice presidential can-
didate J. Danforth Quayle, for example, Gore alleged that Re-
publicans "want to stack the Supreme Court with justices
who will take away the right to privacy."327 As one commenta-
tor concluded shortly before the election, "[a]bortion seemed
to be the only legal issue mobilizing voters."32 Raspberry
aptly pointed out that abortion had "become a proxy" for other
controversial issues, including free speech, church-state sepa-
ration, privacy, and racial and gender issues.329
The Court therefore may indirectly have affected a sub-
stantial number of votes since the widespread defection of
women voters from Bush was attributable in part to disillu-
sionment over the Thomas nomination and concern about the
GOP's increasingly hard-line position on abortion and gender
discrimination issues. The Court's preservation of Roe v.
Wade by a bare majority of five-to-four in its decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey33 °
may have attracted women voters to Clinton since it demon-
strated the fragility of abortion rights. Blackmun's concur-
ring opinion dramatically called attention to his fear that his
successor would cast a decisive vote to overturn Roe when his
325. Editorial, Bush's Winning Judicial Philosophy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1992,
at 22, 1992 WL 4527698.
326. See, e.g., Abortion Rights Group Targets Republicans, Independents in
Mailing Blitz, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERVICE, Oct. 6, 1992, 1992 WL
5144704.
327. Campaign '92: Transcript of the Vice Presidential Debate (Part II),
WASH. POST, Oct, 14, 1992, at A17, 1992 WL 2161874. Gore repeatedly refused
to respond to Quayle's question about whether he supported the ruling in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), upholding a twenty-four
hour waiting period for an abortion. See Campaign '92: Transcript of the Vice
Presidential Debate (Part II), supra.
328. Richard Carelli, Presidential Legacy May Be Written in Courts, FORT-
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 29, 1992, at 6, 1992 WL 10813588.
329. See Raspberry, supra note 324.
330. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
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advancing years forced him to leave the Court: "I am 83 years
old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do
step down, the confirmation process for my successor well
may focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be
exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be
made."33 The National Abortion Rights Action League em-
phasized the closeness of the Casey vote in its multimillion-
dollar campaign to elect Clinton.3 2 On the other hand, Casey
perhaps detracted from Democratic warnings about the dire
need for a Democrat to nominate Justices insofar as the joint
opinion in Casey, to the surprise of many commentators, in-
cluded three Justices appointed by Republican presidents -
Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter.
While Democrats primarily used the Court issue in con-
nection with abortion, Republicans used it in connection with
crime. As Bush told an Ohio rally shortly before the election,
"I don't want some left-wing judges appointed to the Supreme
Court who don't care about the victims of crime and spend all
their time worrying about the criminals."3 ' Addressing a
Fraternal Order of Police convention, Bush received much
applause when he warned that Clinton would appoint federal
judges "far more sympathetic to criminal rights than those of
victims.""4
Appearing on MTV in June, Clinton spooked conserva-
tives by remarking that New York Governor Mario Cuomo
"would make a good Supreme Court justice." Republicans ea-
gerly seized upon this remark as an example of Clinton's in-
tention to turn the Court to the left. Bush frequently derided
Clinton's remark about Cuomo, predicting that Cuomo's ap-
pointment to the Court would generate "disaster."335 As a
senior advisor to Bush remarked, Clinton's mention of Cuomo
as his "beau ideal" for the Court was tantamount to an-
331. Id. at 943.
332. See Abortion Rights Group Targets Republicans, Independents In Mail-
ing Blitz, supra note 326.
333. Bruce Alpert, Bush Heralds Good Economic News, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al, 1992 WL 4858115.
334. Bill Sloat & Vindu P. Goel, FOP Makes Bush's Day, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 10, 1992, 1992 WL 4300731.
335. James Gerstanzang, Bush Greeted by Applause - and Challenges, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at 1, 1992 WL 2845412. Bush's references to the prospect
of Cuomo's appointment encouraged otherwise lethargic crowds to boo Clinton.
See Martin Kasindorf, He's Closing in Bush, Gaining in Polls, Takes Battle to
Midwest, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992, at 7, 1992 WL 7563674.
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nouncing that he was "not serious about a tough criminal jus-
tice system or the death penalty.""6 Similarly, conservative
commentator Thomas Sowell averred that "[ciriminals will
have another friend on the high court if Clinton follows
through by putting Cuomo there."37 Hilary Clinton's in-
volvement as a lawyer in social causes exacerbated fears that
Clinton would nominate liberal judges."'
Liberals likewise recognized the election's significance for
the lower federal bench. As an ACLU officer remarked,
"[w]hoever is president the next four years will be able to
change dramatically the dynamics of the federal courts." '339
Approximately one hundred federal judgeships were vacant
during the campaign.3 40  Liberals warned that Reagan and
Bush appointees, who already constituted 534 of the 837 fed-
eral judges, could compose ninety percent of the federal judi-
ciary if Bush won a second term. 41 Pointing out that lower
federal judges have vast power to alter the legal landscape,
particularly since the Supreme Court had reduced its
caseload, liberals alleged that lower federal judges appointed
by Bush and Reagan had eroded the libertarian decisions of
the Warren Court despite their professed abhorrence of judi-
cial activism.342 Critics also faulted Bush for failing to nomi-
nate more racial minorities to the bench, contrasting the five
percent appointed by Bush with the twenty-two percent ap-
pointed by Carter.4 3  One commentator noted with dismay
that none of the three candidates during any of the three de-
336. Phelps, supra note 314.
337. Thomas Sowell, Candidates and Role of Judges, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct.
30, 1992, 1992 WL 3874205.
338. Phelps, supra note 314. In contrast to Dukakis's appointment of numer-
ous Massachusetts judges, Clinton's record as Governor of Arkansas provided
little opportunity for predicting what type of judges he would select, because
Arkansas judges are elected, and the sixty judges appointed by Clinton served
only interim terms. See Marshall Ingwerson, Next President's Impact on Courts
Will Be Powerful, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 1992, at 1, 1992 WL
9871076.
339. Carelli, supra note 328 (quoting Steven Shapiro).
340. See id.
341. See Tony Mauro, High Stakes in the Lower Courts, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
20, 1992, 1992 WL 6281105.
342. As one critic charged, "the Reagan and Bush judiciary has attacked
precedent with gusto and made leaps in interpretation no passive judge would
feel comfortable making," particularly in cases involving criminal procedure.
Mauro, supra note 341.
343. See id. See also The Forgotten Issue, supra note 315.
4552002]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
bates said a word about how they would use lower federal
court appointments to influence the law. 44
V. The 1996 Election
As one commentator aptly remarked, the Supreme Court
was "possibly the most consequential - and the most ne-
glected - issue in the 1996 campaign. ""' Anecdotal evidence
suggests, however, that some individual voters viewed the
Court issue as decisive. 46 Various newspapers also cited the
Court as a major reason for their endorsement of one candi-
date or the other.347
During his successful campaign for the Republican nomi-
nation, Robert Dole briefly tried, but failed, to transform the
courts into an election issue. In a major address in April,
Dole warned that Clinton's re-election could produce the most
liberal court since the Warren era. "We could lock in liberal
judicial activism for the next generation," Dole declared.348
"The social landscape could be dramatically changed."3 4 Dole
promised to exclude the American Bar Association from the
judicial selection process and to replace it with a "nonpartisan
integrity panel" composed of police, prosecutors, crime vic-
344. See Carelli, supra note 328. Conservatives expressed frustration that
judicial issues were not emphasized. See Cal Thomas, Court Should Be Top
Election Issue, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 11, 1992, 1992 WL 10763424.
Bork warned that Clinton would make "a lot of very liberal appointments and
they will go sailing through the Democrat-controlled Senate," which would tilt
what he described as "a very liberal activist court" even farther to the left. Eric
Houston, Bork Sees Battle for Court Control, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 3, 1992 WL 4816299. See also Matt Campbell, Clinton Edge on Supreme
Court: Bork Predicts Democrat Would Name 3, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 31 1992,
1992 WL 6475365.
345. Richard Berke, High Court Is Missing Issue in Campaign, Oct. 20, 1996,
STATE-J. REG. (from New York Times News Service editorial), 1996 WL
13471266.
346. Some voters said that the Court issue convinced them to vote for Dole.
See Maria Saporta, Economy, Ethics Weigh Heavily as Execs Choose Clinton or
Dole, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 16, 1996, 1996 WL 8236661. See also My
Choice '96, STATE-J. REG., Oct. 14, 1996 (letter to editor), 1996 WL 13470642.
347. See Editorial, Both on Record and for the Future, Voters Should Re-Elect
Clinton, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 20, 1996, 1996 WL 5874271; Editorial, Four More
Years for Flawed Clinton, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, 1996 WL 6768992.
348. Harvey Berkman & Claudia MacLachlan, Don't Judge a Book. . ., NAT'L
L. REV., Oct. 21, 1996, at Al.
349. Id. Dole explained that he had voted for all but three of Clinton's 187
judicial nominees, including both of his Supreme Court nominees, "out of defer-
ence to a president's constitutional prerogative." Id.
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tims, legal scholars, and representatives of various legal and
professional organizations. "Originally founded to ensure
competence and integrity in the bar, the ABA has become
nothing more than another blatantly partisan liberal advo-
cacy group."350
Dole directed particular criticism at the law enforcement
decisions of Clinton's appointees. "A startling number of Mr.
Clinton's lower-court judges have demonstrated an outright
hostility to law enforcement," Dole alleged.35' On the floor of
the Senate, Dole alleged that Clinton's nominees "are at-
tempting to stamp their own brand of liberalism on Amer-
ica"352 and that "[t]he President may talk a good game on
crime, but the real-life actions of Clinton judges ... often
don't match the President's tough-on-crime rhetoric."3 53 Dole's
warning, however, appeared to have little resonance with
voters, and Dole quickly reduced judicial issues to a minor
role in his campaign.
Some commentators believed that Dole's efforts to make
judicial appointments into a major election issue failed be-
cause Clinton's court appointments were generally moder-
ate.35 Indeed, many liberals expressed disappointment dur-
ing the presidential campaign that Clinton's nominees to the
federal courts had been so conservative. 5 Although Clinton's
judicial nominees rankled conservatives-as one conservative
activist complained, Clinton only had "backed away from
radicals and settled for liberals"356 -Clinton's nominees did
not offend the temper of the general public. Commenting on
the unimportance of judicial issues in the campaign, a politi-
cal scientist observed that "[i]f Clinton had appointed the lib-
eral equivalents of Thomas and ... Scalia, then he might
have scared the Republicans. But the main criticism of
Breyer was that he had too many holdings in Lloyd's of Lon-
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. 142 CONG. REC. S8440 (1996).
353. Id at S9359.
354. See Berkman & MacLachlan, supra note 348.
355. See Nat Hentoff, Bill Clinton's Judges: Clinton's Nominees are Less Lib-
eral than Ford's and Nixon's, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 29, 1996, 1996 WL 11170465.
356. Berkman & MacLachlan, supra note 348 (quoting Thomas L. Jipping,
Director of the Judicial Selection Monitoring Project at the Free Congress
Foundation).
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Another observer attributed the low profile of judicial is-
sues to the absence of "recent dramas to draw public atten-
tion to the [C]ourt's work or its members," in contrast to 1992,
when memories of the controversial Thomas nomination re-
mained fresh, or 1988, when the fight over the Bork nomina-
tion was recent."8 The deputy manager of Clinton's campaign
ascribed public apathy about the Court to the prominence of
economic issues among voters.59
Clinton apparently did not emphasize the Court issue be-
cause he perceived that warnings that Republicans would fill
the bench with conservatives would call undue attention to
the liberalism of his own appointments and encourage Re-
publicans to renew the Court issue. Additionally, since
Clinton was far ahead in the polls, he did not need to energize
core constituents such as feminists or gays who might have
responded to the Court issue.6 ° Conservatives also may have
had less interest in the Court because they had despaired of
overturning Roe v. Wade and had turned their attention to
legislative remedies such as bans on late-term abortions.61
Rather than making any sustained effort to emphasize judi-
cial issues, Democrats and Republicans alike limited them-
selves to sporadic, if often spirited, references to the courts."'
Although the candidates hesitated to embrace the Court
as an election issue, African-American voters emphasized its
importance. As one black columnist explained, "[t]he fact
that whoever is President during the next four years will
have the opportunity to appoint at least two new members to
a Supreme Court that has made five-to-four decisions against
affirmative action and redistricting is as urgent a reason as
African Americans need to defeat ultraconservative ...
Dole." '363 An African-American woman who was a Clinton
357. Id. (quoting Robert A. Carp of the University of Houston).
358. See Berke, supra note 345.
359. See id. (citing Ann Lewis).
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. Addressing the Democratic National Convention, New York Governor
Mario Cuomo shouted, "The Republicans are the real threat to the Supreme
Court, don't you forget that!" Id. In his vice presidential acceptance speech at
the same convention, Gore warned that Republicans "want a president who will
appoint the next three justices of the Supreme Court so they can control all
three branches of government and take away a woman's right to choose." Id.
363. Walter Farrell, A Massive Black Vote for President Clinton Is a Matter of
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delegate to the Democratic National Convention declared in a
newspaper column, "[T]he make-up of the Supreme Court is
near and dear to the basic human rights I value. A Dole
presidency would guarantee an end to a woman's right to
choose and civil rights protections."364
Wrongly forecasting that resignations would occur during
the next four years, some Republicans and conservatives tried
to revive Dole's early attempt to make the courts an election
issue. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich stated in October
that the principal difference between the candidates was in
the type of persons they would nominate to the Supreme
Court, and he predicted that "the next president is going to
decide the shape of the Supreme Court for a generation."365
Similarly, Elizabeth Dole, in campaigning for her husband,
warned that the next President might appoint as many as
three Justices."' And, campaigning for Republican senatorial
candidates, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Orrin Hatch
of Utah emphasized that continued Republican control of the
Senate would help to prevent Clinton from making left-wing
appointments to the federal courts.6 7 Despite such cam-
paigning, Dole himself continued not to emphasize the court
issue."'
As Clinton had no opportunity to make any appointment
to the Court during his second term, the lack of prominence of
Survival For African Americans?, JACKSONVILLE FREE PRESS, Oct. 23, 1996,
1996 WL 16628720.
364. Barbara Lee, 'Democrats Must Put Money Where Mouths Are,' OAKLAND
POST, Sept. 4, 1996, 1996 WL 15809565.
365. Gil Klein, Election the Swing Vote; Choice of President to Set Makeup of
Supreme Court, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 20, 1996, 1996 WL 12352343. As
one conservative warned, "[i]f Clinton is reelected, there is virtual certainty that
liberal judicial activism will dominate the Supreme Court - and, therefore,
American law and society - for decades to come." David Wagner, Will the Voices
of Reason Be Audible After Election?, INSIGHT MAG., Nov. 11, 1996, 1996 WL
11224970 (published before election).
366. Dennis Gale, Elizabeth Dole Boosts Campaigns of Her Husband and
Pressler, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERVICE, Oct. 27, 1996, 1996 WL 5418264.
367. See C. David Kotok, Republican: Senate Must Check Clinton, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 21, 1996, 1996 WL 6035765.
368. See Martin Mawyer, Dole's Lost Army of Christian Soldiers, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 1996, at C-4. After Dole's final debate with Clinton, conservative
columnist Cal Thomas faulted Dole for failing to talk about "what liberal Su-
preme Court justices will do to further undermine the value and fabric of life."
Cal Thomas, Dole Uses Jabs Instead of Knockout Punch, BUFF. NEWS, Oct.
21,1996, 1996 WL 5874684. Many conservatives expressed irritation that Dole
did not emphasize the Court issue. See id.
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judicial issues in the 1996 campaign was prophetic. Since,
however, Clinton continued to reshape the lower federal
bench, more voters of both parties perhaps ought to have
heeded Dole's warning early in the campaign that the elec-
tion's outcome could have a significant impact on the federal
courts.
X. The 2000 Election
Judicial issues were more prominent in the 2000 election
than in any election since 1968. One newspaper editorial
aptly described the Court as "a relatively quiet but powerful
issue in this year's presidential race." '369 Many newspaper edi-
torials endorsing Gore cited the Supreme Court as a reason
for their choice."' The salience of judicial issues probably re-
flected the paucity of other significant issues,.. the growing
public recognition of the Court's importance, and the possi-
bility of several vacancies on the Court during the next presi-
dential term since Chief Justice Rehnquist was seventy-six,
Stevens was eighty, and O'Connor was seventy. Additionally,
the close five-to-four votes in favor of conservative positions in
many cases made the importance of appointments seem espe-
cially compelling. Moreover, the dearth of foreign policy is-
sues resulted in greater focus on domestic issues that could
have been affected by judicial decisions. Judicial issues also
369. Editorial, Tweaking the Court, MINN. DAILY, Oct. 24, 2000, 2000 WL
28356265.
370. For example, The Boston Globe explained that
a Bush court, composed of what he calls "strict constructionists," would
set back the clock for women's reproductive freedom, environmental
and consumer protection, and civil rights by dismissing federal solu-
tions in favor of an uneven system tied to the whim of each state. The
impact of these court appointments - and hundreds of others in lower
federal and appeals courts - will echo long after Gore and Bush are
writing their memoirs.
Gore for President, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2000, 2000 WL 3349070. See also,
e.g., Vote for Gore-Lieberman Ticket, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.),
Oct. 29, 2000, at 4H, 2000 WL 28986999; Election Choices, MORNING STAR
(Wilmington, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2000, 2000 WL 27834526.
371. Celinda Lake, a Democratic pollster, explained in September that the
Supreme Court was becoming a prominent issue because "people have no idea
what to make this election about. They don't know what the major distinction
is between the candidates. They're having a really hard time figuring out what
issue they're supposed to vote on. And that's elevating the importance of [the
judicial issue], too." All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast,
Sept. 5, 2000), 2000 WL 21471860 (transcript).
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may have become more prominent because there may have
been a widespread assumption that Congress would remain
so closely divided that the next President could not promote
any major legislation. In the absence of major legislation, the
courts would make important policy decisions. Pollsters were
surprised to find that many voters understood that the elec-
tion could shift the balance of the Court.372
As in the previous several elections, liberals and Demo-
crats emphasized the importance of judicial issues. Warnings
about the significance of the election became even more
apocalyptic in 2000 than in other recent elections. "Wake up,
America," Helen Thomas exhorted in her syndicated column
shortly before the election. "If ... Bush wins . .. an ultracon-
servative majority will dominate the ... Court for years to
come . . . . All I can say is 'cry the beloved country' if Bush-
appointed conservatives prevail on the high bench."3 73 Simi-
larly, journalist Tom Wicker warned that "[t]hree more Scalia
and Thomas style votes would transform what's now a back-
and-forth Court into a conservative bastion that could last for
generations . . ."' Jesse Jackson declared that the election
"may be the supreme issue, because it's not about the next
four years, it's about the next forty years."375 And the Maine
attorney who revealed Bush's 1976 arrest for driving while
intoxicated declared, "I see Bush as a dangerous candidate
•.. and someone who would appoint Clarence Thomas a chief
justice of the Supreme Court [sic]."7
Democratic candidate Albert Gore, Jr. amplified this
theme in many of his campaign speeches. In tightly-
contested Michigan nine days before the election, Gore de-
clared that
The Supreme Court is at stake. There are going to be
372. See id. (remark of Democratic pollster Celinda Lake).
373. Helen Thomas, The Supremes: They're What the Election is All About,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 2000, 2000 WL 26093860.
374. Tom Wicker, Up for Grabs: The Supreme Court and the Election,
NATION, Oct. 9, 2000, at 11.
375. Laurie Asseo, Clinton: High Court at Pivotal Point, AP ONLINE, Oct. 24,
2000, 2000 WL 28615299. Jackson warned that Bush's Court appointments
could lead to "a radical reversal on the rights of women and workers and con-
sumer class lawsuits." Wire Service Report, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 25, 2000, at A4, 2000 WL 3950825.
376. Bob Kemper & Stephen J. Hedges, Bush Charges 'Dirty Politics' in DUI
Flap He Says He Learned from '76 Arrest, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2000, 2000 WL
3729054.
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three, maybe four ... maybe even five justices of the Su-
preme Court appointed by the next president ... . Think
about civil rights. Think about women's rights. Think
about human rights. Think about antitrust law. Think
about Federalism. All of these issues are on the ballot...
377
Gore made similarly dramatic warnings in other speeches.
In Knoxville a few days before the election, Gore alleged that
Bush had pledged to move the Court "to the extreme right
wing."379 Despite Gore's frequent references to judicial issues,
some liberals urged Gore to issue even more pitched warnings
about the election's effects on the composition of the judici-
380
ary.
In his efforts to assist Gore, President Clinton also took
up the judicial issue. Speaking on radio a few days before the
election, Clinton reminded listeners of "all these appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court and the other courts that are
377. Gore in His Own Words, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Oct. 30, 2000.
378. Speaking at a labor union meeting in October, Gore declared that
[t]he Supreme Court is on the ballot November 7, because the next
president will appoint two or three perhaps even four justices out of
nine, a majority that will interpret our Constitution for the next thirty
to forty years. The cases now pending before the court, the controver-
sies that have been decided but will be revisited, those that have been
decided by a five to four margin ... include civil rights, labor rights,
equal rights, women's rights, federalism, the future of individual liber-
ties. These issues could be determined for several decades into the fu-
ture, and some rights that are now taken for granted could be lost
overnight.
Vice President Al Gore Jr., Remarks at the Service Employees International
Union Meeting (Oct. 21, 2000), 2000 WL 1563606 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript).
Similarly Gore declared in his discussion of the Court in Madison a few days
later that "[wiomen's rights are at stake. Disability rights are at stake. Civil
rights are at stake. Labor rights are at stake. Individual rights are at stake.
Federalism is at stake." Vice President Al Gore Jr., Remarks at a Campaign
Event (Oct. 26, 2000), 2000 WL 1594422 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript). See also Vice
President Al Gore Jr., Remarks at Rally Held in Green Bay, Wis. (Oct. 30,
2000), 2000 WL 1612378 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript).
379. Sandra Sobieraj, Gore Hits Bush's Social Security, AP ONLINE, Nov. 3,
2000, 2000 WL 29037473. Similarly, Gore warned in Green Bay a few days be-
fore the election that "[tihe Supreme Court is at risk here. Equal rights and
women's rights and civil rights and disability rights and federalism and anti-
trust law and the basic interpretation of our constitution for the next thirty -
forty years is very much on the ballot this fall." Katherine Q. Seelye, Gore, Try-
ing to Fend Off Nader, Pledges to Push Campaign Finance Reform, N.Y. TIMES
NEWS SERV., Oct. 31, 2000.
380. Judy Mann, A Watershed Election for Women's Rights, WASH. POST, Oct.
27, 2000, at Cl, 2000 WL 25424884.
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going to come up."38 Addressing an Arkansas audience on the
eve of the election, Clinton alleged that the judicial issue was
"a big deal" in the election because there was a five-to-four
majority on the Court "that is determined to limit the ability
of our national government to protect and advance the civil
rights and basic public health, safety and welfare of the
United States." '382 At a forum sponsored by the People for the
American Way two weeks before the election, President
Clinton expressed his belief that "[v]irtually no Americans,
outside those who follow the day-to-day decisions of the Su-
preme Court, understand just how many of our... rights are
at stake by virtue of the possibility of different Supreme
Court appointments."
383
As in other recent elections, Democrats warned in par-
ticular that the election could determine the continuation of
abortion rights. In his acceptance speech at the Democratic
National Convention, Gore declared, "Let there be no doubt. I
will protect and defend a woman's right to choose. The last
thing this country needs is a Supreme Court that overturns
Roe v. Wade."384 The National Abortion Rights Action League
aired television ads in closely contested states warning that
"[a]s president, George Bush would reverse the Court with
anti-choice justices Scalia and Thomas in control."85
On the eve of the election, a poll indicated that sixty per-
cent of voters believed that Bush was unlikely to appoint Jus-
tices who would keep abortion legal, while seventy percent
believed that Gore would appoint Justices who would protect
abortion rights.386 Gary Bauer, a pro-life activist who was an
381. Interview of the President by April Ryan, American Urban Radio (Nov.
1, 2000), in U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 2, 2000, 2000 WL 26850803.
382. President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to Arkansas
Civic Leaders Luncheon (Nov. 5, 2000), in U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 5, 2000, 2000
WL 26850894. Clinton contended that "[tihe Supreme Court is to the right of
the Republican Congress already." Id.
383. President William J. Clinton, Remarks at a People for the American
Way Reception (Oct. 24, 2000), in 36 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
Doc., 2000 WL 13131826.
384. Vice President Al Gore Jr., Acceptance Speech at Democratic National
Convention (Aug. 17, 2000), 2000 WL 1161104 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript).
385. David Callender, Pro-Choicers: Not Nader, CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 28,
2000, at 2A, 2000 WL 24293428. Some observers feared that this strategy may
have backfired by drawing more attention to Nader. See Matthew Cooper, Just
Mad About Nader, TIME, Nov. 6, 2000, 2000 WL 28889173.
386. See Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, Undecided Voters Hold Key to Elec-
tion, Poll Indicates, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Nov. 6, 2000, 2000 WL-NYT
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unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nomination, was
one of the few notable conservatives who openly agreed with
liberals that Bush's election was likely to lead to the over-
turning of Roe."7 Bauer also predicted that if Bush were
elected and were careful in his appointments, "we could see in
relatively short order the court moving in a much strongly
traditional direction on a number of... very important mat-
ters. 3 8
Various commentators pointed out, however, that Roe
appeared to have a solid majority of six Justices on the Court,
even though fewer Justices tended to oppose state regulations
of procedures that limited abortion,389 and that other issues,
particularly affirmative action and federalism, were more
likely to be affected by a change of Court personnel.9 ° As Jef-
frey Rosen pointed out, the remarks by the candidates about
the Court during their first debate repeated "slogans from old
debates that may not turn out to be central during the next
four years.""3 1 Even Gore supporters who warned that Bush's
election could result in the Court's rejection of Roe acknowl-
edged that Congress also had an important role in protecting
abortion rights.92 Similarly, as an NYU student remarked
during the election campaign, "abortion rights are not neces-
sarily controlled only by a few progressive judges, but by
mass social movements and feminist activism."3 In observ-
ing that Gore's warnings about Republican Court appoint-
ments did not seem to resonate with many younger voters,
some Gore supporters contended that younger women were
0031100237.
387. Speaking on NBC's Today show late in October, Bauer predicted that
Bush's appointment of more than one Justice to the Court would result in the
reversal of Roe and the return of the abortion issue to the states. See Charles
Lane, Clinton Presses Bench Question, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at A12, 2000
WL 25424233.
388. All Things Considered, supra note 371.
389. See Gil Klein, Next President Could Change the Ideology of Supreme
Court, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 2, 2000, 2000 WL 27229891 (quoting A.E. Dick
Howard); Steven B. Presser, How Bush Would Fix the Supremes, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 5, 2000, 2000 WL 3729660.
390. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000,
(magazine), at 74.
391. Id.
392. See Judi Dutcher, Issue of Choice at Stake in Election, STAR-TRIB., Nov.
4, 2000, 2000 WL 6996144.
393. Chris Choi, Editorial, Whoever Wins the Election, No Reason to Go Kill
Yourself, WASH. SQUARE NEWS, Nov. 7, 2000, 2000 WL 29107057.
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less worried that Roe would be overturned because they were
too young to remember a time when abortion was illegal. 4
Next to abortion, discussions of the courts arose most of-
ten in connection with racial issues, particularly affirmative
action. Bush's praise of Thomas especially bothered some Af-
rican-American voters. Speaking at a Gore rally in Los An-
geles, a black clergyman alleged that Thomas had "done more
damage to the cause of African-Americans than all the jus-.
tices who have come before him."95 In a speech at an African-
American church in Pittsburgh on the Sunday before the elec-
tion, Gore suggested that Bush would appoint racist Supreme
Court Justices. Gore declared that when Bush "says he'll ap-
point strict constructionists to the Supreme Court, I often
think of the strictly constructed meaning that was applied
when the Constitution was written - how some people were
considered three-fifths of a human being."396 Although Gore's
remark was ambiguous and essentially incoherent, commen-
tators from a broad spectrum criticized Gore's remark for its
apparent unfairness,"' and efforts by Gore supporters to de-
fend it fell flat.3 9 Many attributed it to Gore's desperation in
394. See Michael M. Phillips, Spoiler Fears Open a Generation Gap in the
Nader Camp, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2000, 2000 VL-WSJ 26615618.
395. Celi Connolly & Mike Allen, Bush Rests As Gore Barnstorms in Michi-
gan, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2000, at A17, 2000 WL 25425148. Referring to Tho-
mas's nomination by Bush's father, he added that "the branch does not fall far
from the tree." Id.
396. Naftali Bendavid, Gore Sticks to Social Security Theme, Unleashes Emo-
tional Attack on Bush, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2000, 2000 WL 3729615.
397. National Public Radio commentator Mara Liasson believed that Gore's
statement was "hyperbole, and it's over the line." Fox News Sunday (Fox News
radio broadcast, Nov. 5, 2000), 2000 WL 2650039 (transcript). One editorial de-
clared that
Gore is leveling a charge at Mr. Bush that is so outrageous it becomes
ridiculous; namely, that Mr. Bush would seek out - and find - a bench
full of vacuum-packed, mint-condition 18th Century jurists. Mean-
while, the vice president seems to have forgotten a few little things
even the strictest constructionist would never overlook - namely, the
13th Amendment ... which, of course, abolished slavery, not to men-
tion the 14th and 15th Amendments, which endowed all citizens with
equality under the law and voting rights.
Editorial, Gore on Good and Evil, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at A14, 2000 WL
4169153.
398. On CBS's Face the Nation, Bob Schieffer asked Gore campaign chairman
William Daley if it was not "a stretch" for Gore to suggest that "Bush would ap-
point people to the Supreme Court who think African-Americans are not quite
whole, that they're just three-fifths of a human being." Face the Nation (CBS
television broadcast, Nov. 5, 2000), 2000 WL 8427846 (transcript). Daley re-
466 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
attempting to energize black voters on the eve of the elec-
tion.399
As in previous elections, Republicans were more laconic
about judicial issues. Speaking in Kansas City shortly before
the election, Bush stated only, "I'm for a Supreme Court that
reflects our values in this country.""'9 Although Republicans
boasted that Bush, unlike Gore, did not make abortion issues
a litmus test for Supreme Court nominees,4 °1 this argument
may have backfired insofar as it called attention to Gore's ap-
parent commitment to preserving abortion rights. Some
commentators speculated that Bush tried to ignore the issue
because he recognized that the prospect of judicial nullifica-
tion of Roe v. Wade would cost him votes.4 °2
Conservatives tried to minimize the election's effect on
judicial appointments. Bruce Fein, for example, declared
shortly before the election that "rumors of an apocalyptic
change in Supreme Court decisions ... seem vastly exagger-
ated," regardless of the election's outcome."' Various com-
mentators pointed out that there was no certainty that any
Justices would retire during the next presidential term, °4
plied that Bush
[sihould explain what he means by strict constructionist in today's
times. And those people who hear that phrase and think back to when
people who used the phrase ... looked at ... many ... Americans in a
different way than they did the majority, then you have an obligation
to explain that and be very direct about it, or don't use phrases about
it.
Id.
399. Mara Liasson explained that "[Gore] said it in a context where he wants
to get African-Americans to go to the polls. . . . They've never been as enthusi-
astic about him as they are about Bill Clinton. That's why he said it." Fox
News Sunday, supra note 397.
400. Scott Canon, Balance of High Court May Hinge on Election, KANSAS
CITY STAR, Oct. 30, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 7748488.
401. See Jeff Mize, GOP Governors Rallying for Bush, THE COLUMBIAN (Van-
couver, Wash.), Oct. 24, 2000, at C5, 2000 WL 24842010 (quoting Rhode Island
Governor Lincoln Almond, a pro-choice Republican).
402. As Nina Totenberg explained,
Republican pollsters concede privately that, the possibility of overturn-
ing Roe v. Wade can do nothing but harm Bush in the election. This is
probably why Bush rarely, if ever, mentions the Supreme Court in his
appearances, and has said he will have no rule that his nominees must
oppose the Roe v. Wade decision, or any other decision of the court.
All Things Considered, supra note 371.
403. Bruce Fein, Presidents and Justices, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at
A14, 2000 WL 4168045.
404. See, e.g., id. As Fein stated, "none of the Justices hinted at retirement.
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that political realities would encourage either Bush or Gore to
appoint centrist Justices, and that the Court's fidelity to
precedent, as demonstrated by its decisions reaffirming Roe
and Miranda, militated against radical change regardless of
the Court's personnel.4"6  However, some conservatives
warned about the prospect of Court appointments by a Demo-
cratic president."' Speaking at a Republican rally in Penn-
sylvania, one G.O.P. operative warned that a Gore Court
"would shred the Constitution."40 Shortly before the election,
a dozen conservative Roman Catholic lawyers in the District
of Columbia issued a five page document entitled Supreme
Consequences, which analyzed abortion, morality, and paren-
tal rights issues that the Court was likely to hear in coming
years. 9 The report warned that "[t]he liberal judicial activ-
ists whom Al Gore would appoint to the Supreme Court would
run roughshod over core Catholic values and over laws con-
sistent with these values." '° Oklahoma Governor Frank
Keating warned that Gore's election could tip the Court's bal-
ance on such controversial issues as abortion, prayer in
schools, and the exclusion of gays from the Boy Scouts.
Warning that the Court would ban student-initiated prayer
before football games if Gore appointed a Justice, Keating de-
None [were] medically ailing. Their mental faculties [were] uniformly acute.
Since Supreme Court appointments are for life, no vacancies appear[ed] on the
horizon." Id.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. Next to abortion and race, gun control may have been the most signifi-
cant subject in which judicial issues played a role in the 2000 election. A Na-
tional Rifle Association flier declared: "Fact: If elected, Gore will pack the U.S.
Supreme Court with ... anti-gun activists who will agree with the Gore De-
partment of Justice that you have no right to own any firearm." Canon, supra
note 400. The actor and NRA activist Charlton Heston alleged that Gore's op-
portunity "to appoint as many as four U.S. Supreme Court justices" would give
Gore "the power to hammer your gun rights into oblivion." Morning Edition
(National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 24, 2000), 2000 WL 21481989 (tran-
script).
408. Jack Roberts, Cheney Fires up Party Faithful, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lan-
caster, Pa.), Nov. 4, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 3823538.
409. Larry Witham, Catholic Bishops Urge Pro-life Voting, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2000, at C3, 2000 WL 4168964.
410. Id. C. Boyden Gray, White House counsel to President Bush, declared
that "[o]ne thing you can be sure of is that there will be a philosophical differ-
ence in the way the two candidates go about choosing judges." Laurie Asseo,
Clinton: High Court at Pivotal Point, AP ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2000, 2000 WL
28615299.
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clared that "[ylou can say goodbye to prayer in school for all
purposes, forever, and that's not America.W
1
'
Voters may have responded favorably to Republican ef-
forts to use the Court to win votes. A poll conducted in Wis-
consin shortly before the election showed that voters pre-
ferred Bush to make Supreme Court appointments by a
margin of forty-seven to thirty-seven percent.412
Meanwhile, some centrists expressed fear about the judi-
cial appointments of both major candidates. As journalist
Stuart Taylor, Jr. explained, the Court's
lunge to the left would be almost as worrisome as a lurch
to the right, at least to those of us who want to see our
grandchildren grow up in a nation focused more on indi-
vidual merit than on racial proportionality, and who don't
want a nationwide, court-imposed ban on tuition vouchers
for students at religious schools, and who think the
Court's four more-liberal members go too far when they
argue for abandoning any effort to enforce the Constitu-
tion's outer limits on the regulatory authority of Con-
413gress.
The candidates discussed federal judicial appointments
briefly in the first of their three debates. Although both de-
nied that they would apply any litmus test to candidates on
abortion or any other issue,414 Bush vowed to nominate "strict
constructionists, " "' while Gore expressed his preference for
judges who would interpret the Constitution "as a document
411. Tom Murse, Reject Gore's 'Politics of Division,' Ridge Tells 200 at Rally
in Lititz, LANCASTER NEW ERA (Lancaster, Pa.), Nov. 2, 2000, at B1, 2000 WL
3823180. Keating added that "[t]o suggest, which Breyer and Ginsburg would
and a Gore appointment will .... that the Boy Scouts will be forced to accept
gay Boy Scouts is simply not mainstream value [in] America." Id.
412. See Alex J. Borsuk, Bush Gains Edge in State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Nov. 1, 2000, 2000 WL 26093272.
413. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Election 2000: The Case for Partisan Gridlock, NAT'L
J., Oct. 28, 2000, at 3382, 2000 WL 25041755.
414. Although Bush flatly declared, "I am pro-life," he explained, "Voters
should assume that I have no litmus test on that issue [abortion] or any other
issue." Govenor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore Participate in
Presidential Debate Commission Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), 2000 WL 1466168
(F.D.C.H.) (corrected copy). Bush added, "The voters will know I'll put compe-
tent judges on the bench, people who will strictly interpret the Constitution and
will not use the bench to write social policy." Id. Gore agreed that "it's wrong to
use a litmus test." Id.
415. Id. Bush expressed his conviction that "judges ought not to take the
place of the legislative branch of government, that they're appointed for life and
ought to look at the Constitution as sacred." Id.
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that grows with our country and our history"'416 and predicted
that any judge that he appointed would favor the retention of
Roe v. Wade."7 Gore accused Bush of using the phrase "strict
constructionist" as "code words ... for saying that the gover-
nor would appoint people who would overturn Roe v. Wade,"
particularly since Bush had named Scalia and Thomas "as
benchmarks for who would be appointed." 8 Bush pointed to
his record of Texas judicial appointments as evidence that he
would appoint highly qualified persons to the federal bench. 9
Despite Bush's praise for Scalia and Thomas, Bush ap-
peared generally to have appointed moderates to the Texas
Supreme Court. The President of the Texas Bar Association
contended that Bush had "appointed people with good strong
judicial credentials who tended to be conservative but not
doctrinaire."20 Some observers pointed out, however, that
Bush's appointments to the Texas court were not the ideal
laboratory for predicting his federal appointments because
the Texas Supreme Court hears only civil appeals and be-
cause national political considerations might be very differ-
ent.4
21
As in previous elections, the Supreme Court was the fo-
cus of most discussions of judicial issues. Some commenta-
tors emphasized the importance of discussing the vast impact
of the lower federal court appointments. Some argued that
lower federal judges were more powerful than ever because
the Supreme Court has accepted fewer cases during recent
years.4"' Herman Schwartz emphasized that while the Su-
preme Court hears only about seventy-five cases per year, the
courts of appeal decide 25,000 to 30,000 cases annually: "for
all but a tiny fraction of cases, they are the courts of last re-
416. Id.
417. Gore stated that "[i]t'd be very likely that they'd uphold Roe v. Wade."
Id.
418. Id.
419. Bush stated that "I've named four Supreme Court judges in ... Texas,
and I would ask the people to check out their qualifications, their deliberations.
They're good, solid men and women who have made good, solid judgments on
behalf of the people of Texas." Id.
420. Harriet Chiang, Election Could Shape Supreme Court for Years to Come,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 24, 2000, at A4, 2000 WL 649896 (quoting Lynn Liberato).
421. See id. (quoting Anthony Champagne, a political scientist at the Univer-
sity of Texas at Dallas).
422. See Wicker, supra note 374, at 11, 12, 16.
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sort."42 Some liberals expressed doubt that Gore would
nominate judges who were sufficiently liberal because they
doubted Gore's commitment to liberalism.424 Other liberals
predicted that the political realities of the confirmation proc-
ess would moderate Gore's judicial appointments.9
Gore supporters used the Court appointments issue to
warn Nader supporters that draining votes from Gore would
help to elect Bush. A coalition of liberal activists who trav-
ersed five closely contested states during the final ten days of
the campaign to discourage voting for Nader emphasized that
Bush's judicial appointments could adversely affect environ-
mental protection, abortion rights, and gay rights.426  Re-
minding a Seattle audience that liberals who snubbed Hubert
H. Humphrey in 1968 helped to elect Richard Nixon, the
President of the Sierra Club declared that "[tioday the dead
hand of... Nixon is still writing Supreme Court decisions in
the body of Chief Justice William Rehnquist. '27  Similarly,
the President of People for the American Way warned Nader
supporters that history would judge Nader harshly, despite
Nader's otherwise distinguished career, "if he gives the Su-
preme Court to the right wing."4 " Gay activists likewise used
judicial appointments as a means of discouraging votes for
Nader .49  And even many of Nader's environmentalist con-
stituents feared that Bush's Supreme Court appointments
could lead to judicial decisions that weakened federal envi-
423. Herman Schwartz, More Than Abortion Ruling at Stake in Presidential
Election, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at M-2, 2000 WL 25914652.
424. See Patricia J. Williams, Getting Out the Vote, NATION, Oct. 30, 2000, at
11, 2000 WL 17719046. For example, Bob Wing, editor of ColorLines magazine,
expressed wariness about the prospects of Gore's judicial appointments because
of Gore's association with the centrist Democratic Leadership Council. See id.
425. For example, Nan Aron of the Alliance for Justice predicted that Gore
would follow Clinton in "trying to win favor both from Republicans and Demo-
crats." Asseo, supra note 410.
426. See James Dao, Democrats Ask Nader to Back Gore in Swing States,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A20.
427. Sam Howe Verhovek, 5-State Tour Seeks to Shift Nader Voters to Gore
Camp, Oct. 30, 2000, at A17.
428. Dao, supra note 426.
429. For example, Elizabeth Birch, Executive Director of the Human Rights
Campaign, declared that "[w]hatever value Nader brings to the public discourse,
it pales compared to handing the federal government and Supreme Court over
to George Bush." James Dao, Gore Allies Swarm to Block Nader Vote, THE
COMMERCIAL APPEAL MEMPHIS, Oct. 25, 2000, at A8, 2000 WL 27939106.
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ronmental legislation.43 ° Likewise, one Nader supporter, a
law school dean, contended that Gore's supporters tended to
"overestimate the Court's role as an active progressive power
and fail to see its essential commitment to maintaining a cen-
ter (whether center-right or center-left). It is movements in
society that motivate the Court to move. 431
Nader denounced Democratic warnings about abortion as
"a scare tactic. '3  Nader contended that Republicans did not
really favor overturning Roe because this would "shatter the
party."14 33  Nine days before the election, Nader pointed out
that reversal of Roe would not end abortion but rather merely
permit the states to decide the issue, 34 a remark over which
he soon expressed regret.3 This statement outraged many
Gore supporters, who pointed out that return of the issue to
the states would permit states to ban abortion even though it
would also allow them to keep it legal."3
Nader also emphasized the negligible effect a Democratic
President would have on judicial appointments. In a rally in
Madison, Wisconsin, Nader pointed out that the Senate ap-
proved Scalia's nomination by a vote of ninety-eight to zero,
and that Thomas received the votes of eleven Democratic
senators. "Now they've got the temerity to lecture me about
the Supreme Court?," Nader mockingly asked.43 ' Nader also
alleged that "the corporate Democratic judges" appointed by
Clinton to the federal bench had assisted the Clinton Admini-
stration in its contraction of civil rights and civil liberties in
such areas as habeas corpus, search and seizures, and depor-
tation proceedings.3 Nader also complained that the Clinton
430. See Melissa Henneberger, Nader Sees a Bright Side to a Bush Victory,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at A29.
431. Williams, supra note 424 (quoting Peter Gabel, President, New College
School of Law).
432. Henneberger, supra note 430.
433. Jeff Mapes, Lieberman Asks Nader Supporters to Vote for Gore,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 28, 2000, at A04.
434. Nader Scoffs at Impact of Taking Votes From Gore, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30,
2000, at 8, 2000 WL 3727298.
435. See Henneberger, supra note 430.
436. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Don't Blame Ralph, NATION, Nov. 20, 2000, 2000
WL 17719120 (claiming that there were "at least fourteen states ready to crimi-
nalize abortion the minute they get the go-ahead").
437. Mark Sherman, Democrats Try to Stem Nader Tide, ATLANTA CONST.,
Nov. 2, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 5484558.
438. See Ralph Nader, NATION, Nov. 13, 2000, at 2, 2000 WL 17719078 (let-
ter to editor in issue published before the election).
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Administration had withdrawn controversial nominations in
response to Republican pressure, dropping worthy candidates
"like a hot potato."439 Nader predicted that Gore would not
appoint "anyone remotely so visionary or brave as" Brennan
or Marshall, and "[n]ot even anyone so progressive as Justice
David Souter."' Assuming that the Republicans would con-
tinue to control the Senate, Nader argued that Orrin Hatch,
the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, "has a veto on
any nominations that come from a Democratic presidency."44'
Meanwhile, Nader reminded voters that the liberal Justices
"Warren, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter were Re-
publican nominees," adding wryly that "a lot of Democrats
think those justices were not so bad."44
In an apparent response to Nader, Gore warned that
while "there are some people who actually say it doesn't make
any difference who appoints the next three justices of the Su-
preme Court," this was "a luxury of indifference and ironic
detachment and cynicism" that "those whose rights and lives
are on the line ... cannot afford." 3
III. CONCLUSION
Judicial issues rarely have played a prominent role in
439. Id. The only examples that Nader provided were the nominations of Pe-
ter Edelman to the Court of Appeals and Lani Guinier to serve as Chief En-
forcement Officer of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. See
id.
440. Id.
441. Ralph Nader, News Conference at the National Press Club (Oct. 25,
2000), 2000 WL 1586163 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript).
442. Id. In discussing his own criteria for Supreme Court appointments,
Nader emphasized judicial temperament, a sense of injustice, and a sense of
history. See Ralph Nader, News Briefing at the National Press Club (July 18,
2000), 2000 WL 986946 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript). Nader believed that "judicial
temperament keeps the mind of the judge open." Id. He also believed that
judges should comprehend injustice because "if you don't have a sense of injus-
tice, you can't have a sense of justice." Id. A sense of history, he contended, was
"extremely important in days when history is being lobotomized from our con-
sciousness." Id. As one Nader supporter argued, "[m]aintaining a woman's
right to choose is an incredibly important issue, but it's not the only issue in-
volved in this election. Is that one issue more important than the Democratic
Party's neglect of organized labor, welfare, the environment, social justice, gay
rights, civil rights, and the poor?" Ryan Nickum, Being True to Yourself, THE
DAILY (University of Washington), Nov. 7, 2000, 2000 WL 29107119.
443. Vice President Al Gore Jr., Remarks at Campaign Event in Madison,
Wisconsin (Oct. 26, 2000), 2000 WL 1594422 (F.D.C.H.) (transcript).
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presidential campaigns and elections.414  As an editorial re-
marked during the 1992 campaign, "the court has never been
a hot-button issue with most voters."44 Professor Lasser has
found that even when judicial issues "have surfaced in presi-
dential elections, they have been largely tangential to the
main concerns of the candidates and the voters." '446 Although
judicial appointments may be the major legacy of many
Presidents, most voters have traditionally shown little
awareness that they are helping to select Supreme Court Jus-
tices as well as a President. Public apathy about judicial is-
sues, however, is yielding to a more sophisticated apprecia-
tion of the connection between the presidential election and
Supreme Court decisions. After emerging sporadically as a
significant issue in several campaigns between 1800 and
1968, judicial issues have become a regular feature of cam-
paigns during the past two decades.
Growing public awareness of judicial issues seems likely
to ensure that judicial issues will continue to have at least a
regular role in future presidential elections. The improve-
ment of media coverage of elections and heightened interest
in the Supreme Court appointment process have made voters
much more aware of the connection between their presiden-
tial votes and the selection of federal judges, particularly Su-
preme Court Justices. In 2000, thirty-six percent of voters in
a Newsweek poll indicated that they regarded the Supreme
Court as a "very important" election issue."' Moreover, voters
appear to have a growing awareness of the manner in which
judicial selection affects a wide range of social and economic
444. National Public Radio commentator Nina Totenberg observed,
It seems a journalistic exercise repeated at least once a decade; cover
stories in the news magazines, major pieces on TV and radio, all
warning the voters that the ballot they cast for president could well de-
termine the direction of the Supreme Court for the next thirty or forty
years. And how does the public react? It doesn't. When the exit polls
are tabulated after the election, it turns out that the Supreme Court
had absolutely no effect as an election issue.
All Things Considered, supra note 371.
445. Silence on the Court, supra note 312. See also William G. Ross, Fighting
Over the Court: It's Tough to Make the Supreme Court into an Election Issue,
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at 75, 77.
446. LASSER, supra note 11, at 266.
447. See The Supreme Question, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 20, 21. Al-
though Newsweek seemed surprised that so few voters regarded the Court as a
significant issue, this figure seems high considering the generally low profile of
the Court in presidential elections. See id.
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issues. The highly publicized brawls over the 1987 Bork
nomination and the 1991 Thomas nomination helped to
stimulate greater public awareness of the Court, as have im-
proved news coverage of judicial issues and the growing ubiq-
uity of legal issues in American life. Although few voters may
pay careful attention to judicial issues or even know the
names of most of the Justices, voters seem to have at least an
inchoate understanding that the Court can affect such highly
charged issues as abortion, affirmative action, school vouch-
ers, school prayer, and violence against women. Many voters
in recent elections also seem to have recognized that one or
more Supreme Court appointments could be imminent be-
cause of the high average age of the Justices. If, as some
commentators believe, judicial appointments have become
more political during recent years, it is natural that the
courts become a more prominent campaign issue.
Judicial issues may also be attaining more importance in
political campaigns because voters believe that they can bet-
ter perceive a correlation between the political positions of
the candidates and the performance of the judges they will
appoint. Voters today may have greater confidence that their
vote may influence the Supreme Court insofar as the in-
creased scrutiny of candidates for all levels of judgeships by
the President, the Senate, the news media, and public inter-
est groups has reduced the traditional risk that judges will
defy the expectations of the Presidents who appointed them.
As journalist Nina Totenberg has pointed out, "[I]n an era
when potential nominees are scrutinized with legal magnify-
ing glasses, the guessing is a lot more reliable than it used to
be.))448
Of course, the process is far from flawless. There will al-
ways be a substantial degree of risk of unpredictability in ju-
dicial performance. 449  As Professor Bickel once observed,
"[Ylou fire an arrow into a far-distant future when you ap-
point a Justice."5 ° During the 2000 campaign, Nader sup-
448. All Things Considered, supra note 371.
449. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confir-
mation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1291-1301 (1986);
Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger, Clouds in the Crystal Ball: Presi-
dential Expectations and the Unpredictable Behavior of Supreme Court Appoint-
ees, 27 AKRON L. REV. 115, 138 (1993).
450. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND AND FRANCE 79
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porters used the unpredictability of the appointments process
as a justification for not supporting Gore when Gore support-
ers warned that the diversion of votes from Gore could help to
elect a Republican who would perpetuate conservative control
of the Supreme Court.451' Despite, however, the celebrated ex-
amples of Justices such as Warren, Brennan, Blackmun, and
Souter, who may have defied the expectations of the Presi-
dents who appointed them, the performance of most Justices
is broadly consistent with the political predilections of the
President by whom they were appointed. It would be difficult
to suppose, for example, that the Court would not have been
more liberal if Democrats had served as President during the
terms of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush.
Notwithstanding the growing appreciation that presiden-
tial elections profoundly affect the Supreme Court, general
public ignorance about such issues prevents judicial issues
from attaining the level of salience in presidential elections
that they probably deserve. As one commentator has ob-
served, "[Vioters who struggle to name their representative in
Congress are certainly not about to base their presidential
vote on a potential Supreme Court vacancy."452 Even when
voters perceive the importance of judicial issues, many of the
most significant and most divisive issues that confront the
courts are too abstruse for most voters to grasp.
For example, few voters are likely to comprehend the
subtleties of the Supreme Court's recent division over pro-
found issues of federalism. Even those voters who, for in-
stance, knew during the 2000 campaign about the Court's re-
cent five-to-four votes nullifying significant provisions of the
federal Violence Against Women Acte5 3 and the Brady Hand-
(7th ed., 1998) (citing Judgment on a Justice, TIME, May 23, 1969, at 24).
451. See Jacob M. Appel, NATION, Nov. 13, 2000 (letter to editor in issue
published before the election). Mr. Appel cited Warren, Brennan, Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Souter as examples of Justices who were more liberal than the
Republican Presidents who appointed them had expected, and Reed, Vinson,
Burton, Minton, Clark, and White as examples of Justices who were more con-
servative than the Democrats who appointed them might have anticipated. See
id.
452. Berke, supra note 345. Mr. Berke quoted University of Houston political
scientist Robert A. Carp as stating, "The Court is an amorphous blob to most
Americans. More people know who Judge Wapner is than Chief Justice
Rehnquist." Id.
453. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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gun Violence Protection Act 4 4 were unlikely to fathom the
Court's complex interpretation in those decisions of the
Commerce Clause and other aspects of federalism.
Complex judicial issues would be difficult for candidates
to explain to voters even if American presidential contests
were designed to permit serious discussion of public issues.
Unfortunately, the quality of discourse in presidential cam-
paigns has declined so much that virtually no issues are dis-
cussed by any political party in any detail or with much nu-
ance. Since even relatively simple issues are over-simplified
in presidential campaigns, more complex judicial issues natu-
rally are beyond serious public debate.5 As one commentator
observed during the 1992 campaign, voters and candidates
were "tempted to shrug the subject [of the Court] off as ar-
cane in a campaign of erupting bimbos and waving flags." "'
The difficulty of conducting any serious discussion about
judicial issues amidst the hoopla of a presidential contest may
also help to explain why discussion of judicial issues in cam-
paigns has tended to be one-sided. There never has been a
campaign in which both major parties have emphasized judi-
cial issues. Normally one party uses it as a stick with which
to assail its opponent, while the other party has reason to try
to avoid it or at least has no cause to highlight it. Moreover,
discussions of judicial issues in presidential campaigns tend
to focus on a small number of salient issues rather than broad
issues that might come before the federal courts. For exam-
ple, one study has indicated that Goldwater's criticisms of the
Supreme Court for its decisions on reapportionment and
criminal justice had far less resonance with voters than did
his discussion of the school prayer decision because voters
were much more aware of the latter than the former.457
During recent years, abortion may have become a more
salient judicial issue in presidential campaigns than such is-
454. See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
455. In an ironic twist, the nature of judicial decision-making may contribute
to such superficiality. As Professor Stephenson has pointed out, "because the
legal process seems almost invariably to characterize even the most complex
problems as if they consisted only of two sides - one for, the other against -
what the Court says and does may in turn make it easier for parties and candi-
dates to sharpen and clarify opposing positions." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at
22.
456. The Forgotten Issue, supra note 315.
457. See Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 206, at 35.
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sues as affirmative action or states' rights because more vot-
ers are aware of the Court's position on abortion and because
the constitutionality of abortion may constitute such a stark
and emotional issue. Moreover, abortion may serve as a sym-
bolic issue that provides a reliable guide to how a candidate
might stand on an array of other issues.458 Nevertheless, it is
strange that other judicial issues receive so much less atten-
tion. During the 2000 campaign, for example, it is odd that
the Court's recent decisions on handguns and violence against
women received so much less attention than did Roe. Even
though few voters were likely to comprehend the technical
constitutional issues that the gun control and domestic vio-
lence decisions involved, these decisions were not necessarily
more complex than Roe, and the Court's nullification of part
of the handgun and the domestic violence laws in five-to-four
votes should have provided a dramatic illustration of the im-
portance of upcoming Court appointments.
Paradoxically, the difficulty of discussing complex judi-
cial issues in the context of a presidential election may help to
raise the profile of judicial issues in campaigns to the extent
that candidates try to bring these issues alive through the use
of extravagant rhetoric. Perceiving that judicial issues are
too subtle and complex for thorough discussion, candidates
and their surrogates sometimes reduce judicial issues to
soundbites, warning that their opponents will transform the
Court into a den of dangerous radicals - loony left or radical
right, depending upon which party is sounding the alarm.
It is ironic that an institution so dignified as the Supreme
Court has so often provided the target of histrionic campaign
rhetoric. Not since 1924, when voters left Madison Square
Garden in droves while LaFollette offered serious analysis of
specific Supreme Court decisions has any candidate tried to
lecture campaign audiences on the niceties of the law. Afraid
that they will speak over the heads of voters, presidential
candidates often over-simplify judicial issues and use over-
wrought verbiage in an effort to kindle attention for issues
that otherwise might bore or confuse voters. Such treatment
458. See Raspberry, supra note 324. On the eve of the 1992 election, Rasp-
berry explained that he would base his vote largely on whether a candidate
would appoint pro-choice Justices because he regarded this as "the litmus test
for determining whether a nominee is on the moderate-to-liberal side of scale or
on the conservative-to-hard-right side." Id.
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of judicial issues cheapens discourse about the Court and can
undermine public respect for the judiciary by making the
Court seem like nothing more than a political institution.
Moreover, superficial criticism of the Court that is politically
motivated may inhibit more responsible critics from voicing
concerns about any of the Court's decisions. 9
Similarly, some critics have complained that the Court is
not a proper campaign subject because judges cannot publicly
defend themselves and that unfair allegations about the
courts that could undermine public faith in the judiciary will
therefore go unanswered. 40 But while the Court cannot easily
defend itself,461 it has other articulate champions, particularly
the candidates and spokespersons of the party that opposes
the Court's critics, who often relish the opportunity to defend
the Court against the alleged radicalism of those who would
dare criticize it.
Moreover, judicial issues may have less prominence than
they deserve because the Court itself today is not a subject of
unusual controversy, in contrast to past elections such as
1896 and 1924 when the judiciary emerged as a major issue.
Since the present Court is difficult to label as "liberal" or
"conservative," the general direction of the Court no longer
459. As Anthony Lewis remarked during the 1964 campaign,
One sad thing about the charges of Senator Goldwater, observers feel,
is that they tend to make more precise and scholarly criticism of the
Court difficult. There are law professors who feel deeply that the Court
is wrong on specifics, and they may hesitate to say so now for fear of
being lumped together with other less informed critics.
Lewis, supra note 189.
460. See, e.g., Celler, supra note 201.
461. In discussing attacks on the Court during election campaigns, Professor
Stephenson has pointed out that
the Supreme Court is ill-equipped to defend itself in the court of public
opinion. Traditionally, justices speak through their published opinions,
and are reticent to comment publicly on their reasoning or its implica-
tions. The Court's public information office may be the only one in
Washington that does not more than its name implies: it adds no "spin"
nor explanation to the announcements and documents it releases.
STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 179-80. Similarly, Stephenson points out that
the Court
does not "fight back" as do other officials and agencies that have been
scorned or scourged. The Court lacks nearly all routine tools of politi-
cal sparring: appropriations, ostentatiousness, jobs, contracts, and in-
vestigation. Indeed, any forays by the Court into "politics as usual"
would damage its legitimacy by calling into question its independence
and impartiality.
Id. at 222-23.
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provides a lightning rod for criticism. Controversies instead
revolve around individual decisions of the Court, which run
the gamut from conservative to moderate to liberal. In this
context, Democrats must caution against a conservative cap-
ture of the Court, a warning which is less likely to inspire
voter enthusiasm than is a clarion call to reverse the Court's
direction.
The impact of judicial issues in presidential campaigns
also may be muted because the issue often is little more than
a reflection of how voters already feel about candidates. For
example, a voter whose support of Gore was based upon his or
her perception that Gore was more pro-choice than Bush was
not likely to prefer Gore merely because Gore may have been
more likely than Bush to appoint pro-choice judges to the fed-
eral courts. In an era of low voter turnout, however, the judi-
cial issue may motivate some voters to travel to the polls be-
cause they perceive that judicial appointments raise the
stakes of the election. The prospect of upcoming Supreme
Court nominations also stimulates political activists to
greater commitment and provides an incentive for fund-
raising.462 Even when judicial issues merely reinforce voters'
attitudes toward candidates, presidential campaigns may
stimulate public discussion about judicial issues in a manner
that helps to form or clarify attitudes about such issues."' In
462. During the 2000 election, for example, the People for the American Way
issued a seventy-eight page report entitled Courting Disaster, which warned
about the dangers of "a Scalia-Thomas Supreme Court." PEOPLE FOR THE
AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION, COURTING DISASTER: HOW A SCALIA-THOMAS
SUPREME COURT WOULD ENDANGER OUR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (2000), at
httpJ/www.pfaw.orglissues/judiciary/reports/courtingdisaster-fullcopy.pdf.
463. As Professor Stephenson has observed, "The Court may facilitate the
definition and clarification of candidates' and parties' positions on critical issues
in a campaign." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 231. As Stephenson explains,
This proposition is plausible because of the two avenues along which
the Supreme Court ordinarily enters or is pulled into campaign war-
fare. First, the Court generates an issue on which candidates or par-
ties then take difference positions. This does not mean that the Court
literally invents a dispute by causing division on a subject where none
previously existed. Rather, the Court thrusts an existing subject about
which people hold conflicting views into national politics by proclaim-
ing one side or another as constitutionally correct. When this occurs,
the Court is said to have "nationalized" an issue. The second path un-
folds when the Court takes sides on a question that has previously di-
vided the parties at the national level. In this instance, the Court
stokes the controversy, but the issue exists independent of the Court.
In both, the Court's actions allow one party to wrap itself in the Consti-
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this way, presidential campaigns are part of what Louis
Fisher has called the ongoing "constitutional dialogue" among
voters, legislators, executive officials, and judges at both the
federal and state levels of government.
In particular, campaigns enable a candidate to read the
pulse of his supporters in a manner that may influence his
policies and judicial appointments if he is elected. For exam-
ple, the vociferous warnings by Democrats during recent
presidential campaigns about the importance of maintaining
a Court that does not interfere with abortion may have pro-
vided sharp reminders to Democratic candidates that their
core constituents will be deeply disappointed if they do not
appoint pro-choice Justices. Conversely, the failure of Re-
publican voters and activists during the 2000 campaign to
emphasize the importance of appointing Justices who oppose
affirmative action may suggest that they were not deeply an-
tagonistic toward affirmative action.
Just as judicial issues can enable voters to influence can-
didates, presidential candidates may help to shape voter
opinion by the manner in which they treat judicial issues.
For example, Murphy and Tanenhaus concluded that Gold-
water's attacks on the Court in 1964 helped to "articulate,
mobilize, and legitimize conservative sentiment against the
Court.""64 Similarly, the efforts by Nixon and Wallace during
1968 to blame the Court for rising crime rates may have
helped to mobilize public support for the appointment of
judges who were less solicitous of the rights of criminal de-
fendants. During recent elections, the increasingly frequent
references of candidates to the Court may have helped raise
voter awareness of the Court's importance.
Presidential elections also may have at least an indirect
impact on the Court by making the Court more broadly aware
of public opinion. The landslide re-election of Roosevelt in
1936, for example, may have influenced the Court's decision
early in 1937 to reverse recent precedent to uphold a state
minimum wage law.465 Similarly, the defeat of Goldwater in
tution while the other party goes on the attack against the judiciary.
Id. 231-32.
464. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 201, at 47.
465. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Although this de-
cision was not announced until after President Roosevelt had proposed his
Court-packing plan in February 1937, it was decided in December 1936. See
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1964 may have emboldened the Warren Court to continue its
activism on such issues as civil rights and criminal justice.
The role of judicial issues in elections during the past
sixty years also illustrates the nearly universal acceptance of
the Court's power to review the constitutionality of state and
federal legislation. In contrast to the virile attacks on the
courts by populists, progressives, and labor unions during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no major can-
didate or political movement for the past sixty years, with the
partial exception of the 1968 Wallace campaign, has ques-
tioned the validity of judicial review or attacked the Court as
an institution. Even the most vociferous critics of the Court
seem content to continue to allow the Court to exercise vast
powers, either because they support such powers or because
they recognize the political impracticability of curbing them.
The reluctance of presidential candidates to advocate
Court curbing measures or to criticize individual Justices also
reflects the abiding respect that Americans have for federal
court and judges, even though the Court's counter-
majoritarian function has and probably will continue to in-
spire controversy that will find expression in presidential
campaigns.466 Even LaFollette in 1924, Goldwater in 1964,
ROSS, supra note 31, at 311.
466. As Professor Stephenson has observed, "That the Court has long ap-
peared deliberately to be different in its behavioral and political isolation from
the rest of the national government may make the Court an inviting target for
someone eager to convince voters that the justices have thwarted the will of the
people." STEPHENSON, supra 1, at 23. Indeed, Stephenson has argued that the
Court's "susceptibility to entanglement" in presidential politics is not merely the
product of occasional decisions that "touch a public nerve," but rather "has nec-
essarily been a characteristic of American politics because of the constitutional
role that the justices have assumed for themselves" insofar as the Court "some-
times appears, or ... can be made to appear, at odds with a political system
founded on the 'consent of the governed."' Id. at 220-21. (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, as this article demonstrates, many candidates have questioned the
Court's role in American politics, even its countermajoritarian function of pro-
tecting the rights of minorities. Various presidential candidates have warned
against allowing unelected judges to serve as guardians of personal liberties.
For example, Goldwater declared during the 1964 campaign that "[niow per-
haps the constitutional restrictions on the popular branches of government
aren't enough to protect the rights of minorities and individuals. If this is so,
the restrictions should be tightened up by the normal process of amendment,
not through judicial revision of the Constitution." GOLDWATER SPEECHES, su-
pra note 188 (speech at Charlotte, North Carolina, Sept. 21, 1964). Similarly,
LaFollette during the 1924 campaign, in an apparent reference to Meyer,
averred that [uin all the history of this world, no people has ever looked to the
courts as the guardian of its liberties. The liberties of the people rest with the
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and Wallace in 1968 generally refrained from personal criti-
cism of individual judges, notwithstanding Taft's unpopular-
ity among liberals during LaFollette's day and that Warren
was anathema to many conservatives during the 1960s. In-
deed, it is significant that two of the most vociferous efforts to
transform the judiciary into an election issue were made not
by critics of the Court but rather by defenders of the Court.
These two efforts were the 1896 and 1924 campaigns of Re-
publicans who believed, with good reason, that they could win
votes by alleging that their opponents sought to emasculate
the federal judiciary, which Republicans portrayed as the
bulwark of property rights and personal liberties. Faced with
these attacks, both Bryan in 1896 and LaFollette in 1924 sig-
nificantly muted their earlier criticisms of the courts and
tried to assure voters that they did not intend seriously to
tamper with judicial power.
The issue today, therefore, is not the validity of judicial
power itself but rather who will exercise that power. In a
variation on the old adage, "if you can't beat them, join them,"
voters and politicians of all persuasions today seek to elect
presidents and senators who will appoint judges who will
serve their agendas. Although the Supreme Court remains
the primary focus of the electorate's attention, the growing
tension between the President and the Senate in the nomina-
tion of lower federal judges during the so-called "era of di-
vided government" may be making voters more cognizant that
presidential elections also can have a profound impact on the
composition of the lower federal bench. While few votes may
pivot on judicial appointments, voters are rightly giving more
attention to the types of judicial nominations that presiden-
tial candidates would make.
people." LaFollete Family Papers, supra note 89 (speech at Omaha, Nebraska,
Oct. 20, 1924).
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